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Abstract
Abubotain, Rabaa Ahmed. (2011). Saudi Women in the media: Saudi and Egyptian
Perspectives. Unpublished Masters Thesis under the supervision of Dr. Rasha
Abdulla, Associate Professor and Department Chair, Journalism & Mass
Communication Department (JRMC). The American University in Cairo.
Purpose of the Study:
The aim of this research is trying to differentiate between the way Saudi women see
themselves as well as the Saudi males' perception of them; and the way Egyptians
perceive them. Such perceptions are ignited by global media arms that have critical
roles in shaping and forming opinions or pre-set ideas about Saudi woman.
Methodology:
This research is a quantitative study in which two non probability purposive/snowball
samples are selected: Egyptian and Saudi. A 400 participant of both nationalities is
asked to fill a survey that is created to show the perception they have of Saudi
women. Participants included are above the age of 21, highly educated and must
watch TV for at least an hour per week; however, the Egyptian participants who have
lived, visited Saudi a couple of times for reasons other than religious (Hajj or Omra)
will be excluded to ensure that their created perceptions are neither created, enforced
or changed by what they saw in real.
Major Findings and Discussion:
Television viewership and exposure patterns of Saudis are different than Egyptians.
Saudis follow Saudi and foreign news and never watch the Egyptian news channels,
while Egyptians tend to follow Egyptian and foreign news and ignore the Saudi news
channels. Saudis, on one hand, watch all the entertainment channels available when
Egyptians only turn to Egyptian and foreign and never watch Saudi entertainment.
When seeking information about Saudi women, Egyptians turn to foreign channels,
while Saudis turn to their own local channels. Saudi participants tend to stick more to
their initial source of information; whereas Egyptians tend to seek alternative sources
than their initial chosen one. In general, Egyptians are considered to be a more active
audience than Saudis.
Participants from both countries had different perceptions of the different media. Both
Saudis and Egyptians agreed that foreign media are the most credible, have the
highest quality and most variety; however, they disagreed on which media are the
most trusted. Saudis believe that their own Saudi media are the most trusted, while
Egyptians believe that foreign media are the most trusted.
Moreover, Saudis have a positive perception of their women as well as their country;
however, Egyptians have a negative perception of Saudi women and Saudi Arabia. In
general, participants with negative perceptions from each country had different TV
watching habits. The very few Saudis with a negative perception were light viewers of
TV. They never or rarely ever watch Saudi or Egyptian media and sometimes follow
foreign media. However, Egyptians with negative perceptions were heavy viewers of
TV. They never or rarely watched Saudi media and sometimes watch Egyptian and
foreign media.

Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction

1

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

3

i.

Cultivation Theory History and Assumptions

4

ii. Criticism

5

iii. Cultivation Effects

6

iv. New Media Technologies and Cultivation

7

v. Previous Studies on Cultivation Theory and Perception

7

vi. Relevance to the Study

9

Chapter 3: Literature Review
i. Measuring the Status of Women

11

ii. Elements of the Saudi Society

13

iii. Education

18

iv. Employment

24

v. Internet

29

vi. Driving

32

vii. Gang Rape Incident

35

viii.

38

Marriage

ix. Guardianship

41

x. Saudi Women in the Cinema

43

xi. Television

49

xii. Human Rights Watch

51

xiii.

Women's Satisfaction

52

xiv.

Positive Change Occurring

57

Chapter 4: Methodology
i.

Significance of the Study

60
60

ii. Research Objectives

62

iii. Statement of the Problem and Main Thesis

63

iv. Population and Sample

64

v. Research Questions and Hypotheses

65

vi. Independent and Dependant Variables

67

vii. Pilot Study

68

viii.

Data Collection

68

ix. Statistical Technique

69

Chapter 5: Results
i.

Sample Description

70
71

ii. Television Viewership and Exposure

75

iii. Foreign vs. Saudi Media

84

iv. Perception

90

v. TV Exposure and Perceptions of Saudi Women

100

Chapter 6: Discussion

108

i.

108

Conclusion

ii. Limitations of the Study

119

iii. Recommendations for future studies

120

References

121

Appendix

132
i.

English Questionnaire Sample

ii. Arabic Questionnaire Sample

132
136

List of Tables
Table 5. 1

Participants' age

Table 5. 2

Participants' gender

Table 5. 3

Participants' level of education

Table 5. 4

Saudis' monthly income

Table 5. 5

Egyptians' monthly income

Table 5. 6

Participants' average income rating (in L.E.)

Table 5. 7

Participants' exposure

Table 5. 8

Egyptian participants' visit to Saudi

Table 5. 9

Participants watching habits: News

Table 5. 10

Participants watching habits: Entertainment

Table 5. 11

Qatif girl's sources

Table 5. 12

Alternative sources

Table 5. 13

Audience's activeness

Table 5. 14

Having heard of any Saudi movie

Table 5. 15

Having watched any Saudi movie

Table 5. 16

Most trusted media

Table 5. 17

Most credible media

Table 5. 18

Most accessible media

Table 5. 19

Media with the highest quality

Table 5. 20

Media with most variety of programs

Table 5. 21

Comparing media

Table 5. 22

Distribution of power

Table 5. 23

True or False

Table 5. 24

Participants perception

Table 5. 25

Hours watched vs. Saudi perception

Table 5. 26

Hours watched vs. Egyptian perception

Table 5. 27

Chi Square test

Table 5. 28

Perceptions by viewers of foreign news channels

Table 5. 29

Perceptions by viewers of foreign entertainment
channels
Perceptions by viewers of Saudi news channels

Table 5. 30
Table 5. 31
Table 5. 32
Table 5. 33

Perceptions by viewers of Saudi entertainment
channels
Perceptions by viewers of Egyptian news channels
Perceptions by viewers of Egyptian entertainment
channels

71
72
72
73
73
73
73
74
77
79
81
82
84
85
86
87
87
88
88
88
89
92
93/94
97
99
99
100
102
103
104
105
106
107

List of Figures
Figure 5. 1

Hours spent watching TV

Figure 5. 2

Qatif girl incident

74
80

Chapter 1: Introduction:
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has emerged as one of the strongest global
powers recently with strong international leverage primarily granted by its economic
power stemming from its strength as the world’s largest energy producer of oil and its
evolving industrial power. Being a monarchy where Islamic Sharia is the base of
every rule and decision, article 1 of Saudi law confirms that the Saudi constitution
must be derived from Quran and Hadith only (Mtango, 2004). The Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia is very unique in its characteristics, community and culture.
In Saudi, while abiding strictly to Shari’a, women are more focused upon than
men. In other words, Islamic rules and laws are more apparent in the roles of the
women than the men’s. More focus is given to the women’s dress code, education, job
and seclusion rather than men praying in the mosques for instance. In the past,
Mutawain (legitimate religious officers) forced men to pray in the mosques, trim their
hair, wear certain clothes and not to wear silk or gold. But since the women are
believed to be more obvious symbol or tradition, Mutawain shifted their focus. They
became more concerned with the women’s body and face coverings and their
presence in the public areas. Therefore, Saudi women are more controlled than men
and locked within strict borders.
Allowing no integration of genders, two separate societies exist in Saudi
Arabia: male society and female society. Since the male society is the leading one
with high responsibilities and visibility, Saudi is a male dominating country where
women society is still limited with social, religious and cultural borders (Bahry,
1982). Meaning that, veil is still forced, driving is not allowed, husbands are the
masters of the households, senior positions are held by men and most importantly
women related policies are in the hands of male authorities. However, these factors
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did not stop the emergence of Saudi women power. They became aware of their traits,
skills, conditions and societies and began exerting efforts to develop their families,
country as well as themselves.
In this study, an attempt is made to view the Saudi woman in her own eyes as
well as the eyes of her husband, father, uncle and colleagues as expressed in the local
and global media vehicles. This attempt is then compared to the Egyptian perception
of Saudi women also as portrayed in the media. Such perceptions are ignited by
global media arms that have critical roles in shaping and forming opinions or pre-set
ideas about Saudi woman. Whether struggles, frustrations, dissatisfaction or even the
opposite are portrayed on TV, viewers will be affected by watching. Therefore, a
comparison between the Egyptians and Saudis' perceptions will be made.
To do so, two samples will be selected: Egyptian and Saudi. A 400 participant
of both nationalities will be asked to fill a survey that is created to show the
perception they have of Saudi women. Participants included must watch TV for at
least an hour per week; however, the Egyptian participants who have lived, visited
Saudi a couple of times for reasons other than religious (Hajj or Omra) will be
excluded to ensure that their created perceptions are neither created, enforced or
changed by what they saw in real.

2

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework:
Whether it is cliché to say that Television plays an important role in affecting
the Egyptian, Saudi or any other culture, it remains a fact. Television remains an
important source of information, messages and shared images around the globe. No
matter what types of new media become available, television shows no signals of
weakening (Gerbner et al., 1980 & 1986). Drama, news, talk shows, commercials and
many other programs are aired into every home on a daily basis. Television, having
overcome literacy problem, remains a universally shared source of information and
entertainment. Another factor that sets Television apart from other media forms is its
audience. It targets a large diversified audience around the globe; after the “selka”
invention in Egypt, for instance, the penetration rate of local and satellite TV sky
rocketed. As defined by Gerbner et al. (1986), the TV audience is any available group
at any certain time of the day viewing the TV.
People spend more time watching television than performing any other task
apart from working and sleeping. According to Hammermeister et al. (2005), the time
children waste watching TV is more than any other activity excluding the sleeping
hours. Study performed by him showed that heavy TV users tend to be lonely, shy
and sometimes more depressed than light viewers. This goes back to the fact that they
spend more time watching TV than socializing, gathering with friends and family,
reading, practicing sports or even hobby developing. Jennifer Good (2007) refers to
the habit of TV as a social drug. To her, it is an addiction that remains pleasant when
used in acceptable doses; but, causes major problems when over used.

3

I.

Cultivation Theory History and Assumptions:
Realizing the popularity of television, cultivation theory was initially

developed with intent to explain its effect and influence on its audience’s cultures,
attitudes, perceptions and values. George Gerbner along with Larry Gross, Micheal
Morgan, Nancy Signorielli and James Shanahan developed the theory after extensive
series of research and experiments (Severin & Tankard, 2001).
The Gerbner team’s research was based on surveys and experiments done on
heavy and light TV viewers. Answers given by heavy viewers were closer to the
imaginary world of TV than real life while light viewers gave more realistic answers.
For example, when a question was asked about the percentage of people living in
America, heavy viewers tended to exaggerate the number. The reason behind such
believed overestimated percentage is the high number of American drama,
commercials and shows aired on TV than any other nationality. Also, another group
of heavy TV viewers overestimated the number of Americans working as lawyers
since the percentage of shows that portrays law jobs is high. Heavy viewers are more
inclined to believe that the world is an unsafe place than light viewers as a result of
TV’s heavy portrayal of crimes, rapes and violence in general is elevated. Not only do
they see the world full of violence, but they also have higher feelings of insecurity and
risk (Gerbner & Gross, 1976).
The theory tends to differentiate between heavy and light viewers of TV. For
Gerbner et al. (1980), the heavy viewer is a person who watches TV for more than 4
hours per day. For these types of viewers, television monopolizes over any other
source of information such as newspaper or Internet for instance. The influence of
heavy TV exposure is what Gerbner and his team referred to as cultivation (Gerbner
et al., 1980).
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The main hypothesis of the theory is that television provides certain ideas
about the real life (whether it is positive or negative) to the audience who in return
believe the concepts presented and live with it. In other words, their understanding of
the world becomes “cultivated” by the heavy exposure to TV and so they live in the
imaginary TV world; even though there are many inconsistencies between real life
and that portrayed on TV (Bryant & Zillman, 1994).

II.

Criticism:
The theory was criticized heavily by a number of researchers. Paul Hirsch

(1980) for instance, criticized the Gerbner team for not controlling intervening
variables such as age, gender, education and socioeconomic levels. To him, if all of
these variables were controlled, the TV effect will not remain as large. As a reaction
to these criticisms, Gerbner (1980) further developed on cultivation theory by adding
two concepts: mainstreaming and resonance. Mainstreaming is “when heavy viewing
leads to a convergence of outlooks across groups” (Severin & Tankard, 2001, p. 269).
Meaning that, even if heavy TV viewer participants of low and high income levels
share the same view of crime, light viewers of both levels tend to differ from each
other. Morgan (1986) and Gerbner et al. (1980) explain mainstreaming as the
diminishing effect of intervening factors when dealing with a heavy viewer group
while these variables do affect the results of the light viewers. Results of the heavy
viewers tend to override the differences between the participants while it does not
with the differences of light viewers. On the other hand, resonance is “when
cultivation effect is boosted for a certain group of the population” (Severin &
Tankard, 2001, p. 269). For example, when heavy viewers of both genders see crime
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as a fearful problem, women in this group tend to agree more since their gender
“resonates” with crimes portrayed on TV such as rape.
These additions to the theory modified it; the theory no longer assumes a
unified homogeneous effect on heavy viewers, but it puts other factors into
consideration. Though Gerbner et al. agree with Hirsch that if all intervening factors
were controlled, the effect of TV will be small but it cannot be negligible due to the
effect of constant TV exposure over time (Gerbner et al., 1980).
Criticism to the cultivation theory did not stop here; other researchers doubted
the theory developed by Gerbner. For example, Rubin as well as Perse and Taylor
(1988) concluded, after surveying a group of viewers, the effect resulting from TV
viewing on perception is program based rather than time. Those heavy action viewers
were more concerned about their security and safety while those daytime serial
viewers are more concerned with trusting others. Rubin et al. realizes that the TV
audience is an active target.

III.

Cultivation Effects:
Gerbner and his team refined their theory by dividing the cultivation effect to

two categories: “first order belief” and “second order belief” (Gerbner et al., 1986 and
Hawkins & Pingree, 1990). “First order beliefs” are beliefs regarding the real life
facts; percentage of raped women or percentage of murders for instance. “Second
order beliefs” are believed to be driven from the “first order beliefs”. In other words,
they are the expectations or generalizations created as a result from the “first order
beliefs” such as believing that the world is a dangerous place for women or others.
Hawkins & Pingree (1990) confirm that both types are not constantly correlated
strongly.
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Gerbner et al. (1986) agree that TV exposure over time will have a strong
effect on “first order beliefs” while the “second order beliefs” are more affected by
the other personal variables such as the experiences surrounding each individual or
the neighborhood they live in.

IV.

New Media Technologies and Cultivation:
The 21st century has introduced new communication media of many forms to

the audience. Much more free satellite channels, prepaid channels, DVDs, VCRs and
other devices have changed the audience’s exposure to TV. They are now capable of
freezing a shot, skipping the commercials, rewind a missed program and choose
between unlimited choices of channels. However, Morgan, Shanahan and Harris
(1990) confirmed that this new technology does not affect the watching habits of the
audience. Dobrow (1990) further confirmed this assumption by claiming that heavy
viewers employ the new technology to view more of the programs they are used to
watch and enjoy. Light viewers, on the other hand, use the new media to diversify the
channels and programs they watch.

V.

Previous Studies on Cultivation Theory and Perception:
A study by Moon Lee et al. (2009) attempted to show the effect of TV

consumption on perceptions of America's ethnic groups. The groups included:
Caucasians, African Americans, Asians, Latinos and Native Americans. The
researchers proposed 5 research questions about whether the sample would hold a
positive or negative perception about each ethnic group. More than 450 college
students filled the survey prepared by the researchers to test the stereotypes created as
well as their TV consumption. Results showed that the perceptions of participants
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were positively related to the amount of TV watched and program chosen. For
example, heavy viewers presented more negative stereotypes of all groups except for
the Caucasians. Also, entertainment, sports and educational program watchers had a
more negative perception than those who watched news. Research identified different
perceptions held of each group. For example, African Americans were believed to be
lazy, dishonest, dumb, inferior and unethical while Asians were seen as highly
educated and wealthy. The dominant Latino perception held is hard worker, lower
class and non college graduates while Native Americans were seen as uneducated,
unemployed and alcoholics. As a general result, the more participants watched TV,
the more they held to these TV created perceptions.
In 2009, Brian Quick examined the effect of the hit series "Grey's Anatomy"
on viewers. Grey's Anatomy is a famous series about a group of doctors who work in
a hospital together. Trying to fit in, excel and learn are a few of their concerns. Love
relationships and friendships are created between them and the other hospital
staff/doctors. Grey's Anatomy's doctors are brave and enjoy a lot of courageousness
when dealing with their patients and colleagues. In order to answer and test the
researcher's hypotheses as well as questions, students majoring in mass
communication in a large university in America were asked to fill a survey. Results
showed that students perceived the series as credible and real. The more episodes
watched, the more participants believed that real life doctors are as brave and courage
as those in the series. Risky decisions and heroic acts of the doctors in the show were
seen as a real characteristic to the real world doctors. Grey's Anatomy's watchers
showed more satisfaction with real American doctors for their talents and heroic acts.
On the other hand, Yang, Ramasubramanian and Oliver (2008) were
concerned with the cultivation effect of the American media on the Korean and Indian
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viewers. Surveys were filled by 352 Korean in Gwangju city and 333 Indian in Pune,
Hyderabad, Chennai and Cochin cities. These cities were chosen because of their
large size and ease of American media accessibility. Results showed that the more
American TV is watched, the less satisfaction they had for their countries and
personal lives. Results were universal for both countries in this sense. Participants fell
in love with the American life style. Many of the participants associated nice cars,
expensive watches, playing golf with the American life style.
Another study by Mastro, Behm-Morawitz and Ortiz (2007) aimed at
comparing TV portrayal of Lations and the real American perception of them. Almost
362 college students from a midsize university in America filled the questionnaires
distributed. Female participants dominated the sample by over 69% of the whole
sample. Results supported the relationship proposed by the researchers: the higher the
TV consumption, the stronger the relation between TV's portrayal and real life
perceptions of Latinos. For example, heavy TV viewers all thought that Latinos are
mostly uneducated, lazy, unintelligent, and belong to the lower class while primetime
entertainment programs examined by the researchers portrayed Latinos in the same
exact way.

VI.

Relevance to the Study:
Each publically or privately owned channel will reflect the owner’s culture,

perception, history, social, political and economic background (Gerbner 1958, 1969).
Each owner, whether it is the government, institution or even a single businessman,
will portray and create the imaginary world that he wants or believes. Therefore, the
owner/s will have the power to “cultivate” their viewers according to their input.
However, as Gerbner et al. confirm, the extent of cultivation in each country will
9

depend on many factors unique to each country such as number of available channels,
duration of broadcast, watching habits of the population and diversity of the content
available to view. Egyptians, for instance, might form their perception of the Saudi
women based on what they see on TV whether it is newscasts or entertainment such
as movies, programs and video clips. Whether they watch their local Egyptian
channels or Saudi ones or even seek foreign channels will shape the way they view
Saudis in general and Saudi women in specific. Beliefs can be created from the
imaginary world of TV. Saudis also are affected by the way their women are
portrayed on TV. Some might seek information that confirm their perception, others
might reject the facts contradicting his/ her perception while other may actually
change their perception (either to the positive or negative). Saudis may also insist on
watching their local channels or other Saudi owned private channels or seek foreign
channels to view.
As Kahlor and Morrison (2007) explain, the cultivation theory underlines two
assumptions. First, perceptions influenced by TV are cultivated by the person’s
consumption of TV over time. Second, heavy viewers are presented by a unified
perception of reality which mainly mirrors the mainstream view of the society.
Therefore, no matter what type or program genre a person may watch, the amount
spent viewing TV is what matters. Knowing the two assumptions, this study will
search for the Egyptian perception of Saudi women (based on TV exposure) and
Saudi perception of them (based on TV and their preexisting view of the society).
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Introducing the Saudi Society and the Status of Women:
I. Measuring the Status of Women:
Throughout the study, some terms are continuously used to evaluate the status
of women in Saudi Arabia such as women’s freedom, development and progress.
According to the Webster dictionary, freedom is defined as "the quality or state of
being free, the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action and
liberation from slavery or restraint or from the power of another"; development is
defined as "the act, process or result of developing"; and progress is "a forward or
onward movement and a gradual betterment" However, these dictionary definitions do
not help when attempting to measure and evaluate the status of women. Hence,
operational definitions are provided for indicators of freedom, development and
progress. These include political, economic, educational, health, social and other
elements. Universal standards set by well established organizations or conventions are
used to evaluate the status of women. Therefore, before analyzing the areas of the
Saudi community, conventions and Human Rights treaties and other declarations'
decisions concerning women should be looked at. The articles set by them can be
considered as a benchmark when evaluating the status of women in the Kingdom.
The 1948 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" was adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations. This declaration confirmed that all
individuals of different genders, nationalities, religions and races are equal in all
aspects of life. Hence, women should have equal rights of education, employment and
marriage as their fellow men. For example, Article 16 of the UDHR confirms that
men and women both have the same rights in marriage. They both have the power to
consent the marriage or refuse it, for instance.
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The 1952 "Convention on Political Rights" by the General Assembly agrees
with the UDHR articles. For example, Article one confirms that women should be
able to vote in political elections without bias. Article two further confirms that
women should be capable of participating in the election and run for any position
without discrimination. Article three declares that women can hold any position open
for men without any bias.
The

1958

"Discrimination

Convention

by

the

International

Labor

Organization" agreed on certain articles that refuse the discrimination based on sex,
race, religion or any other factor in employment. Any candidate preference or
exclusion should be only made based on his/her qualification and job requirements
only.
Another General Assembly adopted convention in 1979 agreed on eliminating
any kind of discrimination against women. For example, Article 9 says that both
parents have the equal rights regarding the nationality of their children. Article 10, on
the other hand, focused on education. This article aims at ensuring that women get the
same educational opportunity as their peer men. They both should have equal
opportunities for scholarships and same access to schools, curriculums, exams and
teaching techniques. Article 11 stresses on the equal employment rights for both
genders. In this Article, they stress that women should have the power to freely
choose their profession. Article 12, on the other hand, focuses on the health care
where access should be equally granted to both genders. Article 15 of the convention
says that both men and women shall be equally treated before law.
The 1993 declaration adopted by the General Assembly on "Eliminating
Violence against Women" defined violence as any gender based act of violence which
causes harm or suffering to women whether it is sexual, psychological or physical.
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Article two expanded the violence to also include in family violence toward female
children. The violence may include household abuse or other acts such as
circumcision. Article two also included the harm and suffering to the women caused
by the state or government laws.
Other conventions focused on marriage and all issues concerning it. For
example, some conferences set a minimum age for marriage while others agreed that
both parties of marriage have the right to either approve or refuse the proposal.
Through the study, different areas of Saudi women will be analyzed to
determine whether they enjoy freedom and are developing their status or not. While
reading, one must keep in mind the articles agreed upon internationally to further
compare the women's freedom and development in Saudi Arabia.

II. Elements of the Saudi Society:
Saudi is very different than its neighboring countries as well as foreign
countries when dealing with women related issues. As journalist Asmaa Almohamed
(2007) mentioned, Saudi neighboring countries give much more freedom to its
women than Saudi. In Bahrain for instance, women worked as ministers and
parliament members. Kuwait also has female ministers who worked along with men.
In Saudi on the other hand, women were only hired as advisors to the parliament and
were asked for advice in women related subjects merely. Although many women
recognize the importance of the step, others view it as a décor job. They have no
power in actually changing rules or introducing new ones. It has to be noted that
women of the highest jobs in Saudi still lack full control and power over decisions.

13

The Saudi community has unique characteristics that make the Kingdom more
interesting to discover, such as the power and influence of Saudi religious clerics
“Ulema”, sex segregation and the conflict between Saudi’s conservatives and liberals.
1) The Ulema or religious scholars enjoy tremendous power in Saudi Arabia.
These Ulema have a defined role in the kingdom which is implementing Islamic
Sharia into the lives and policies of the country. The Ulema shape the public opinion
and affect the King and government’s policies. Their approval or disapproval is a
priority prior to any decision. For example, in 1994 the Ulema forced Saudi to
withdraw from the United Nations conference held in Cairo titled Population and
Development (Doumato, 1999). This conference called for men and women equality,
improving the women’s status, using contraceptives for family planning and
increasing the marriage age for girls. The council of Ulema objected to the content of
the conference and saw it as offensive to the Islamic regulations. Saudi Arabia did not
send any sort of a delegation and withdrew from the conference.
For example, as an American living in Riyadh, Judith Caesar was surprised at
the power a Mutawwa (Legitimate Religious Officer) enjoys (Caesar, 1997). They
have the authority to arrest anyone for committing any action they see religiously
inappropriate. There are no written rules that they follow and a Mutawwa can make
use of this subjective manner due to the great power he enjoys. For example, one of
her Christian friends living in Saudi was arrested by Mutawaeen (plural of Mutawwa)
for wearing a cross. Though the Holy Quran encourages Muslims to respect other
religions, Mutawaeen thought otherwise. They did not let him free until he removed
the necklace he was wearing.
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2) Saudi is characterized by its sex segregation policies. They both have
“their” places they belong to, unless they are a family then the male companion is
allowed into the women’s sections. For example, restaurants in Saudi usually have
different seating areas: single men and families. The family section usually hosts
women who come alone or have a relative male companion. Women’s sections
usually included a children’s playing area. Airports also have different sealed rooms
for women’s searching. Sex segregation is also applied in educational premises as
well as working offices.
When Saudi women were interviewed by Mona AlMunajjed (1997) to know
what they think of Saudi’s strict segregation rule; many supported it. A 28 year old
banker thinks that girls will lose concentration in classes if boys are around; therefore
it is better to separate them. A 36 year old illiterate think that a girl’s honor is more
important than education. If education was not sex segregated, she would not allow
her daughters to attend schools since it would harm their honor and their family’s
name. Women also refuse to work with men out of fear of harassment or sitting alone
with them in a room. On the other hand, many saw benefits in gender mix such as
developing a sense of confidence, learning and understanding the other sex and
benefiting from each other’s experiences.
Sex segregation in Saudi put women in a category where they are treated
differently than men. However, the government has lately tried to integrate women
into the Kingdom’s organizations and institutions. Some women were appointed by
the government as consultants for Majlis al Shura. As Amelie Le Renard (2008)
pointed out, these women were selected from the elite families. Their roles were well
defined between advising the Majlis on women related topics and representing the
Kingdom in the international meetings. Elite women of the Majlis conveyed their
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disappointment in their roles. They were dissatisfied with the women related issues’
advisory role they were given. Other women were also unhappy with the elite women
selected since they come from different backgrounds. Belonging to rich families,
studying abroad and being exposed to different experiences made Saudi women feel
unrelated to those consultant elites.
3) For Saudi to remain internally peaceful and with no conflict, a balance
should be achieved between those who seek modernization and change and those who
are tied to the Islamic community with all its restrictions. The problem remains in
trying to balance between the liberals’ needs and the conservatives’ strictness. For
example, Juhaiman Seif el Utaiba, student of the famous religious scholar Ibn Baz,
demonstrated along with some followers in 1979 in Mecca against the foreign
influence. He wanted an end to the westernized universities, television, shopping
malls and the presence of the foreigners themselves in Saudi. The insurrection lasted
for three days and caused the death of 127 soldiers. Foreign forces were called upon
to help in ending the demonstration. This has forced the Saudi governments to
revitalize the regulations and restrictions on women. Overseas scholarships for
women were ended, the presence of a male companion along with women shopping,
eating out and travelling was strictly monitored and women were firmly supervised in
their work areas (Eleanor, 1991).
Having talked about Saudi’s two groups, some of the reasons behind such
division are discussed by Eleanor Doumato (1999). Conservatives view Saudi as the
origin of Islam and so ultimate controls should be imposed since Saudi men and
women are lucky and more privileged than the rest of world. They refer every factor
of life to Islamic Sharia, according to their own understanding of it. Ruralization is
another important factor. People migrate from the rural to the urban to improve their
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economic condition, but remain shocked from the city development. Though Riyadh,
for instance, is a closed community, it remains an open society in the eyes of rural
villagers. The resistance takes place when they come to live in the city; hence fuel in
the conservative group. On the other hand, liberals are fighting for what they think
are basic human rights. Foreign education, travelling abroad and television open their
eyes to the outside world. They come to realize how others live differently. Away
from the state controlled terrestrial channels, Saudis are exposed to other Arab and
non-Arab programs which affect their way of thinking. Education in Saudi has an
effect on both groups. To the liberals, education prepares working material
individuals. Hence, as soon as they graduate, they demand job opportunities. But, it is
undeniable that the curriculums taught in primary schooling through high schools
focuses on the Islamic Sharia and religion. Children are cultivated with ideas about
the ideal Islamic man and woman that they turn to when they grow up.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review:
Literature on Saudi women had an interesting characteristic: contradiction and
extremism. When representing a certain topic about Saudi women, literature is either
pro or against; positive or negative. Each media picked a certain direction, focused on
it and portrayed it. A single writing is not enough to read to get the full perspective of
the Saudi community.
Different elements of the Saudi society shall be discussed from different
frames to show the conflict between them. Some will focus on the positive side of a
certain element while others will focus on the negative. Below, both sides to each
element will be presented.

I.

Education:
According to Al Rawaf and Simmons (1991), the first girls’ public school

opened in the 60s but the real expansion did not occur up until the first Islamic
education conference led by King Khalid Abdel Aziz in 1977. The conference
encouraged families to send their daughters to schools and stressed the Islamic gain
from girls’ education. Girls' education in Saudi was never controlled by the Ministry
of Education just like the boys’, but by the General Presidency of Girls Education
headed by a religious man reporting to the King directly (Al-Hariri, 1987). Being
under the conflict of girls wanting to learn and religious scholars defining the rules,
the government was not expanding its education system rapidly. The country’s
religion and traditions hindered the path of girls’ education.
General Presidency of Girls Education (GPGE), being responsible for girls’
education, created a curriculum a bit different for girls (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991).
In elementary and intermediate levels, girls were learning household matters such as
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cooking and sewing to improve their skills as better housewives; while secondary
level taught them more than household issues to cater for those who wish to attend
universities. In the first year books, girls learn stories about the mother who stays
home taking care of it until the father comes back from work; fourth year books tells
stories about how girls enjoy serving and cooking for the family as well as sewing in
their spare time. By the fifth and sixth years, girls excel in household subjects and
know by heart that a girl’s noble place is at home taking care of the family (Al Rawaf
& Simmons, 1991).
For those who aspire for higher education in the Kingdom, they are given a
choice from a narrow range of alternatives (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991). There are
the GPGE colleges which prepare girls to become elementary and intermediate
teachers. There is also King Saud University off campus centers for women in all the
courses it offers except for engineering, planning and those who conflict with Saudi
women’s nature. Majors varied from nursing and medical to public administration.
Other universities initiated different campuses for girls and started offering more
subjects like economics, arts and Islamic Sharia and Dawa: Um Al Qura University in
Mecca was created in 1971 and King Faisal in Dammam in 1978 (Al Rawaf &
Simmons, 1991).
The curriculum taught was further criticized by many. For example, Doumato
(2003) claimed that, the Saudi curriculum focuses only on inoculating the youth
against foreign influence and imported culture. They are taught to guard the Islam
they learn at school and confront assaults on it. However, when Saudi graduates
peruse higher education out of the Kingdom, they fail Islamic courses they thought
were an easy "A". The reason behind such failure is the lack of diversity in curriculum
taught. In Saudi, the texts focus on what they define as real Wahabi Islam and ignore
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any other sect of Islam or other religions. Saudi cultivates religion as well as norms
and culture accompanied in the way the government wants. Students believe that they
are excellent learners of Islam but soon discover the narrow scope their country
enforces.
Al Rawaf and Simmons (1991) also confirmed that girls in Saudi do not enjoy
the same range of courses, majors or even job opportunities offered to their peer boys.
Saudi men have a variety of majors and even schools to choose from while women
are restricted with few options. Moreover, despite the available schools and
universities, transportation remains a problem. Since they are not allowed to drive,
they need to have a personal driver and a car at their disposal which not all Saudis can
afford. And those who cannot, refuse to send their daughters using other
transportation methods such as taxis or buses.
On the other hand, others saw potential in Saudi girls' education. According to
Andrew Mills (2009), King Abduallah has been encouraging women to seek higher
education and work in diversified fields. Almost one quarter of Saudi’s budget is
allocated for the education sector. Hence, more universities are opening up for women
offering different majors. However as Mills states, the Saudi community has not been
as enthusiastic as the government and remains suspicious about each move. For
example, when only recently Effat College offered architecture and engineering,
feedback was negative from the students’ families as Ibrahim said. Parents refused to
pay almost 100,000$ for their daughters to be architects and then stay unemployed
since no firm in Saudi hires female architects. Firms must first have the capacity to
establish different offices for women then start hiring them as architects or engineers.
However, there is a gradual improvement in this case since firms started to hire them.
Students applying have also increased from 10 in architecture and 3 in engineering in
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2005/06 to 62 and 45 respectively in 2009. Also, with no doubt the high salary the
government offers to female teachers encourages more women to attend universities.
These women later on pass the encouragement to their kids, family and neighbors to
go to schools. This vicious circle helped in expanding the girls’ education in Saudi
Arabia.
Other literature also confirmed the positive moves Saudi is taking in develop
girls' education. Laessing & Alsharif (2009) stated that, since 2005 King Abdallah has
been pumping reforms that have all been new to the Saudi community which have
been refuted by the conservatives and appraised by the liberals. In 2009, these reforms
included the built of the first sex desegregated university King Abdullah University of
Science and Technology (KAUST). The new Aramco established 10 billion dollars
university has come to life in 2009 where both genders will study and attend classes
together. King Abdallah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) is the first
university not under the educations ministry’s responsibility and control. It is
established and run by the country’s oil company Aramco (Barclay, 2009). The
university is built on the shores of the red sea in Thuwal, Jeddah. The 9000 acres sand
was turned in just three years to glass and marble buildings surrounded by palm trees.
The university’s classes are gold plated, library has numerous diversified books and
researches and laboratories are endorsed by the best technology including the 14th
fastest computer in the world developed by IBM (Jenkins, 2009). The university is
very well backed financially by the state that it requires no fees from all students and
grants them with full scholarships.
What gives a lot of attention and focus to the university is not only its
hugeness nor its well equipped buildings, but also the fact that it broke Saudi’s most
focused upon taboo: sex segregation. KAUST allows both students to take classes
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together and mix up in university’s gardens, cafes and restaurants (Associated Press,
2009). Liberals see the university as a tangible development and believe in its benefit
to the young in specific and to the country as a whole. However, those who opposed
objected to the KAUST’s gender mixture. For the first time in the history of Saudi
Arabia, religious clerics had no control and power over any educational institution;
hence, could not change it. As Hoteit and Radsch confirm, the university being under
Aramco, allows no intervention from the religious clerics. Sheikh Saad ben Nasser
Alshithri was one of the clerics who fought harshly against the university but with no
change. He resigned from the Saudi Senior Clerics Council and the king accepted his
resignation. Soon after he resigned, he appeared on Al Majid channel based in Qatar
lashing about the sex desegregated university and wondered whether the Islamic state
is still following the Islamic Sharia or not. Al Majid channel soon announced that it
carries no responsibility on what Sheikh Alshithri said and it remains his own
personal judgment. Al Watan’s editor in chief Jamal Khashoggi said that following
such a strategy is one of the religious clerics’ old tricks to gain power over the
university (Hoteit & Radsch, 2009).
According to the reports of International Network News (2003), it is usual to
witness members of the royal family and prominent businessmen donating for the
education of the women. For example, King Fahd’s wife, princess Al Jouhara held a
reception in the University of King Saud to discuss women’s condition and status in
the country. She encouraged women to pursue their education and for that reason she
donated almost 42 million Saudi Riyals for improving the education sector in Saudi.
With such money, universities are capable of opening more women’s departments.
Women’s only universities are being established too. As the Riazat Butt (2008)
mentioned, by 2010, a new university will open its doors for women of Saudi which is
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endorsed by King Abdallah personally. The university is considered one of the largest
women’s only institutions where majors that were once reserved for men are open.
Researchers of Saudi believe that such university will empower women and open
career opportunities that were once forbidden. The university will have all the needed
facilities such as library, auditoriums and conference rooms. The university will host
more than 40,000 students in the majors of medicine, nursing, dentistry,
pharmacology and naturopathy along with a 700 bedded hospital.
At the end, as Mahmoud Saleh (1986) confirms higher education expenditure
per student in Saudi Arabia is considered one of the largest ones of the world. Saudi’s
government does dedicate a huge portion of the national income for students’
education. However the question here to ask is the position of women in this.
According to him, women enrollment in universities depends on three factors. First
the demand; whether girls are eager to apply or not. In fact, it does not only depend on
the girls’ eagerness, but also on their parents as well. Willingness of the families to
send their daughters to universities will determine the demand on them. Second factor
is the financial ability of the country itself to provide such a service, building separate
universities with all its needs for instance. Libraries, equipments, classrooms and
much more are needed to establish universities segregated from men. Last factor is
human resource. These universities built for girls are female run institutions. All the
teachers, staff and administrators must be women. Having qualified women
employees in Saudi Arabia is not an easy matter at all. Having said all that, the girls’
higher education sector in Saudi has grown fast. It started when four girls were
admitted as external students with the calls of Kind Saud in 1961. In 20 years the
number reached 19,860 and still jumping.
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II.

Employment:
Saudi women's involvement in the labor force was witnessed during the recent

years. Data by Doumato (1999) showed that the private sector have employed women
in the areas of journalism and advertising while the public sector remained the highest
women employer. Most Saudi women work as teachers because it is the least
controversial job for women. They work in a perfectly sex segregated areas, suitable
working hours and with good salaries. By 1994, more than 70% of public school
teachers were Saudi women who took the places of the foreigners. Nursing and
medical physicians come in the second place following teaching (Doumato, 1999).
According to Bahry (1982), Al Rajihi initiated the first Saudi female bank in
1980 where all the operations were done by women for women customers. By 1982,
almost 13 other women branches of different banks were created. This step not only
gave women job opportunities, but also allowed Saudi women to have control over
their own accounts without the need of their fathers, husbands or uncles (Bahry,
1982). The employees of the banks gained a lot of publicity and were being
interviewed in the press or over the radio. They also gave speeches in schools and
universities where they talked about their success and benefits of working.
Believing that banking, education and medicine are the only available fields
was proven wrong when women entered journalism and headed many departments. In
Zuhair Kutbi’s (1998) book, he mentioned that Saudi women journalists have
produced many writings and articles that enhanced and empowered women and their
roles in the Kingdom. During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saudi writers were one of
the reasons that encouraged Saudi to interfere and free Kuwait. Their columns and
petitions to the King allowed them many privileges that were once banned such as
creating women’s charity and empowerment associations. Journalist Suhailah Zain
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Elabidin, working for Al Madina newspaper, was promoted to be the editor of the
female section in 1981 (Bahry, 1982). She was the first Saudi woman to hold a high
position and so received huge publicity. She became a role model for young girls and
housewives who saw in her the aspired change.
Not only that, but many businesses in Saudi hired women to work in places
created for women only. As Dan Murphy (2007) mentioned, Saudi women can now
go shopping for their cars personally in female showrooms where sellers are from the
same gender. They even work in women run factories’ assembly lines; but as soon as
the bell rings, workers cover up for the male workers to enter and collect the finished
products (Murphy, 2007).

Additionally, a female industrial city will soon be

constructed in Saudi Arabia which will included more than 80 women run factories.
Almost 10,000 women will be hired in this project that is cooperation between Saudi,
China and Malaysia (Ambah, 2004).
Although, Saudi women lacked the education, skills, trainings and all the
aspects needed for the job, King Fahd insisted on "Saudization" of the jobs even for
women. Foreigners were rapidly replaced with local employees and officials pushed
Saudi women to attend nursing schools and attracted them with lucrative salaries
(Kolleen et. al., 2006). Many multinationals and other companies were asked by
Saudi's officials to train the women so that they easily replace foreigners. For
example, Hewlett Packard (HP) offered Saudi women training courses (Ame Info
News, 2006). As Amr Hassan, general manager of HP, mentioned, Saudi women have
a real demand toward information technology learning and products. Hence, HP
offered an IT training special for the female population of the Kingdom. Until 2006,
more than 2300 women have successfully completed the trainings with HP.
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The working environment for women was questioned by many. For example,
when journalist Karim El Gawhary wanted to speak to Saudi working women, he
wondered how the meeting would go. He did not know whether he would be able to
meet the women in their work places or it would end up being a phone interview.
Salwa Alireza, employee of a Jeddah based advertising agency, confidently asked the
journalist for a meeting in her office. During the interview, he was surprised to see a
Saudi woman unveiled and professionally working in a western like atmosphere.
Alireza said that on her first day of work, she asked her boss about the dress code
necessary for the agency; he replied “anything goes”. She talks about how both men
and women of the agency appreciate her efforts and work no matter how conservative
they are (El Gawhary, 2004).
Prince Waleed Ben Talal’s music channel and production company “Rotana”
is located in Riyadh. Though it is located in the capital of Saudi Arabia, it keeps a
shocking working environment. Both genders work together in the same place and
women can actually be the bosses over their male colleagues. Sultana Al Rowaili,
Rotana’s human resources manager, says that only those who tolerate gender
integration can work in the company. For that, she came up with a special “Rotana”
hiring interview. While interviewing a male candidate, a woman employee interrupts
as if she has papers to sign or a question to ask. If the male candidate looks
uncomfortable, less concentrated or even stares greatly, Rowaili dismisses him.
According to her, many have dismissed the room themselves as soon as knew they
were going to be interviewed by a woman (Butters, 2009).
Saudi Women joining the labor force was looked from a different perspective
by others. According to Canada News (2008), Saudi and Austrian scientist conducted
a study over 4,400 college students between the years 2007 and 2008 to assess the

26

barrier to female employment. The study proved that even though women view
having a job as a priority, they suffer to find one. Religion was not listed as the
barrier; however, participants believe that societal beliefs are the main challenge to
face. The belief that women are meant to be housewives not workers is why many
women cannot work. Gender competition over job opportunities is another barrier.
Over 80% of the women believed that they should and can compete with men while
only 22% of men believed so. Occupying a top position was not very liked by women
where only 8% agreed to it. Both genders had their opinions about women in the
future where 44% of the women were certain that changes will occur to women’s
rights to 26% of their peer men.
Another challenge working women face is their appeal to marriage. Since
marriage is one of the top priorities to both Saudi women and their families, the
desirability of educated and working potential brides is a question to ask. Educated
girls are the less desired wives to be among the Saudi community (Bahry, 1982).
Many question and fear the character of the highly educated girl and her suitability as
a wife and a mother. Grooms and their parents believe that the higher the education,
the more arrogant a wife could be. She could also be more demanding than less
educated wives. Grooms also fear that these highly educated brides would want to
work, which is something not acceptable by all the society. Men also cannot bear
upon the independency accompanied by high education and jobs. They are used to
being sole masters of the house. But this does not deny the fact that women investing
in their education and career are more selective and picking when accepting a
marriage proposal (Bahry, 1982). Kolleen et al. (2006) further confirms that by
claiming that many Saudis refuse to marry nurses for the old negative established idea
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of nurses. The fear of not getting married forces some women away from this
profession since marriage has a high priority in the Saudi society.
From a business perspective, journalist Asmaa Almohamed (2007)
acknowledges that women are still facing difficulties in establishing their businesses.
Some permits can never be obtained and others are difficult due to the absence of the
male guardian. According to investor Loulwa al-Saidan, she faces many obstacles
when trying to sell or buy a property. She has to take two men to the court to confirm
her identity and then another four men to confirm that the other two are trustworthy
witnesses. Guardian related rules hinders back Saudi business women in running and
developing their businesses and sometimes even in starting them up.
Al Hayat Journalist Amjad Rida was promoted to be the new vice editor in
chief in 1998. Her promotion was soon abolished when some men employees
objected to the promotion and threatened the newspaper with their resignation (AlKhamri, 2008). Another journalist Sabria Jawhar was not permitted into a press
conference she was covering because guards wouldn’t let her in. According to Hana’
Al-Khamri, women journalists do not write their tribal or last names after their
columns out of fear. They fear harassment from conservatives who object to women’s
employment.
The working conditions for women were also looked at from other angles. For
example, Buzbee's interview with Reporter Hoda Al Salem exposed the difficulty
working women face in Saudi. She talks about her experience in Saudi’s largely
circulated newspaper Al Riyadh. Working environment in the newspaper is
customized to the country’s sex segregation policy. Women work behind closed
offices where they take off their abayas and veils. Every morning the office boy from
the male’s side would come leave a pile of letters, faxes and important documents at
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the door for the women to pick up after he has left. She has never met the editor who
is her direct boss. If they have to cover a certain event or speech, the newspaper
provides them with a car and a driver since women cannot drive. During the event,
women are seated in a different room and they cannot ask the speaker questions
(Buzbee, 2001). According to Al Salem, most Saudi women journalists were
appointed by pure luck. None of them attended journalism school; however, they are
mostly good writers since their childhood. When Al Salem was writing about how
Saudi boys spend their spare time, she faced many obstacles trying to interview them.
She cannot meet them in a fast-food place nor wait outside their homes or schools.
Finally she was able to fax questionnaires to internet cafes where young men usually
go. Facing many difficulties surveying men, Al Salem and women journalists usually
focus on women’s topics to avoid problems.

III. Internet:
No doubt that technology has affected nations and cultures applying it;
however, the question remains whether Saudi’s well established culture has been
affected by technology or not. In fact, Saudi’s resistance to change is strong enough to
preserve its culture against the imported technology as much as possible.
Saudi’s goal is to adopt the technology while avoiding its accompanied
“devil” or religiously believed sins. For example, women have not been able to
benefit from the technology of automotives since women’s driving is perceived as a
sinful act that brings shame to the family. Women whom in the past were camel riders
are now just passive riders in the technology of automotives (Elmusa, 1997). To the
Saudi culture, they are making the best of the foreign technology by importing the
latest cars while forbidding women to drive. On the other hand, technology that helps
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in preserving the culture is highly imported and appreciated such as education
technological techniques. Lack of female teachers does not cause a trouble now since
male existent teachers can use audio visual techniques to teach without mixing or
seeing female students.
Only in 1997 that Saudi started considering introducing the internet to the
public. Those opposing to such a move anticipated danger to the Saudi culture and
religion; in other words, they feared the “westernization” accompanied by the Internet
(Teitelbaum, 2002). “King Abd El Aziz City for Science and Technology” (KACST)
was in charge with introducing, setting up, enforcing laws and monitoring Internet in
Saudi. Those interested in being service providers had to sign on abiding certain rules
that included forbidding pornography and gambling websites as well as sites that
violates cultural, religious and political values of the Saudi community. If internet
surfers seek websites that are banned, a message will appear on the screen that says
this website is not allowed and asks them to fill a form out if they think that this
website should not be blocked. Though one might think that KACST receive many
requests to unblock websites that they perceive harmless, they confirmed that they
received hundreds requests from the public to block many more websites (Teitelbaum,
2002).
The phenomenon of Saudi women using the internet is growing rapidly. The
Internet has given them room for freedom and independence away from the society’s
constraints. No mahram (male guardian) or permission is needed; hence, women were
opened up to a novel arena of freedom, networking, socializing, entertainment and
knowledge. Being anonymous on the internet allowed Saudi women to turn to chat
rooms and speak freely about any topic. They talk about sex, love and raise questions
about their status in the society. As Teitelbaum (2002) mentioned, Saudi women’s
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interest in the Internet urged companies to create female run websites. Laki Anti (i.e.
For you), for instance, is a website exclusive for women where many topics discussed
revolve around religion, family and other social issues. When women require
technical help, Laki Anti women technicians answer their questions and offer help.
Other female websites benefited from Laki Anti’s success and created similar sites
(Teitelbaum, 2002).
Anonymity allowed women to create personal blogs and websites where they
write about their lives and experiences freely. The government and appointed KACST
to monitor the blogs closely and block any blog harming the country’s welfare. Blog
contents vary between chronicles to more outrages blogs (Abou Alsamh, 2002). Farah
Aziz’s blog for instance, causes no anxiety for the KACST since she records the
educational experiences of college students with their professors. However, as Abou
Alsamh stated the Saudi Eve’s blog has been blocked on the 2nd of June 2006 when
she wrote about her love life and Islam. No one really knows why her blog was
banned, but she believes that the KACST blocked her since God, Love and sex were
mentioned in the same post together. To many Saudis, talking about God and sex in
the same blog is extremely offensive to Islam. To the Saudi community, romance is
inoffensive only when written in English.
As Abou Alsamh (2002) has cited, Saudis themselves are as concerned about
preserving their culture as their government and officials. Hence, many of them acted
as unpaid un-hired watchdogs. Recently Mohamed Al Mossaed and his friends
formed the “Official Community of Saudi Arabian Bloggers” which is a group that
helps the KACST by reporting blogs they think are offensive to the Saudi community
(Abou Alsamh, 2002). Such groups along with Internet engineers believe that their
mission is to inform fathers and guardians of what the Internet might do to their
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female subordinates. As the British Daily Mail (2008) newspaper reported, a father
murdered his daughter when he found about her chats with a Saudi man on Facebook.
He says that he read about Saudi girls who used Facebook to show their revealing
photos and have web cam conversations with the other sex. Therefore, with the zero
tolerance existence in Saudi in general, he committed his act to preserve the honor of
his family.

IV.

Driving:
According to Doumato (1992), the fear of invasion aroused among Saudis

during the Gulf war, urged King Fahd to request the help of Americans. To protect the
Kingdom, the American troops and military settled in the lands of Kingdom. These
troops involved women personnel who were extremely visible to the Saudi
community. A month later, the king encouraged governments to train and employ
Saudi women in medical and civil defense services. In other words, women were
called upon to join the change occurring in Saudi. King Fahd urged institutions of the
public and private sectors to hire more women in the medical fields as well as the
social services. Women from the royal families as well as others were volunteering
for the training sessions across the kingdom. During this time, the conservative
influence was weak which allowed Saudi to promote women’s participation in
different areas. Feelings of hope were felt by the people of Saudi which encouraged
women to ask for more. They saw this attempt as a path for a brighter future; hence, a
letter signed by Saudi women was addressed to Riyadh governor, Prince Salman bin
Abdel Aziz. In the letter, Saudi women recognized the King’s efforts to improve their
status and hence asked for their right to drive. Being optimistic, women felt that their
request will be approved; but no reply was given.
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In 1990, around 50 women sent their drivers away and drove their cars in the
streets of Riyadh calling for their right to drive. The angry response from the country
was strong and immediate. The Ministry of Interior issued a law banning the women
to drive, governments fired the working women who participated in the demonstration
and their names were published to humiliate them as well as their families (Doumato,
1991). A "fatwa" was issued by the the religious police and Ulema of Saudi banning
the women from driving. They considered it as a religious sin and to those who
commit it as objectors to the sayings of God’s Shari’a.
Such incident was reported from different angles. For example, a report by
Ambah (2009) mentioned that, King Abduallah received a petition signed by almost
500 women who wanted to maintain the ban. They wrote about the harassments they
suffer in malls, streets and working places and mentioned that it will increase if they
were allowed to drive.
Also, Beichman's (2007) interview with Legal advisor Abdel Mohsen El
Obkan, further portrayed support to the ban. He said that allowing women to drive
would only cause harm and danger to the women driving and would cause
unnecessary road congestion.
On the hand, many reports focused on the hostility of the Saudi's reaction to
the strike. According to Doumato (1992), a list of participating women full names
were posted across the country titled “sluts and promoters of corruption”.
Participating women were fired from their jobs, had their passports taken away and
harassed by anonymous phone calls. Media was used to deliver the messages of the
government. For example, one of the children’s programs aired a song by the young
girls singing “we Saudi women shall never drive a car”.
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Moreover, the British Daily Mail (2008) newspaper reported the arrest of a
Saudi woman who was caught driving in the streets of Buraida city. While trying to
get to her sick husband, police arrested her and forced her husband to sign a statement
that as her guardian, he is responsible for banning her from driving ever again.
Other reports focused on the Saudi women's wishes for the ban to be lifted.
Faiza Ambah's (2005) report focused on the 15th anniversary of the driving
demonstration celebration by the Saudi women in a rented hall in Riyadh. These
women privately met and discussed the issue. As Professor Fawzia Al Bakri
mentioned she never thought that after 15 years the ban still exists and women will be
reunited for its anniversary (Ambah, 2005). Women in the reunion agreed that they
are not fighting for the sake of driving itself, but for the principle itself. To them,
driving is a symbol of women’s freedom and rights. One of the 1990 demonstration
participants confirmed that she shall never drive even if the ban is lifted and she
would still hire a driver. For her it is a matter of women empowerment.
Another event was the three minute video of Wajeha Huwaider driving her car
in the streets of the Kingdom that was posted on YouTube (BBC News, 2008). In the
clip, Huwaider drives her car in a private compound where women are allowed to
drive; but then suddenly she takes an exist out of the compound and drives peacefully
in a highway challenging the Saudi laws. The video was posted on the celebrated
International Women day. To her, such act may urge the government to left the ban
imposed on women in Saudi Arabia. Though Saudi conservatives see women driving
“sinful” since it allows integration of both genders, King Abduallah believes that the
day when women drive will soon come.
Also as Faiza Ambah (2005) mentioned, Mohammed El Zulfa completed a
study of the pros and cons of women driving and proposed it to the responsible
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officials who buried his study in a glance. Zulfa said that he received thousands of
threat and anger calls, emails and faxes from Saudis who accused him of harming the
harmony of the Islamic nation. Additionally, author Zuhair Kutbi (1998) believes that
banning women to drive is not a religious driven law; but a cultural one. He says that
there will be no door to hell labeled women drivers; however, those who sit alone
with unrelated foreign drivers will be punished by God who specifically banned the
non relative gender mingling.
Just two days before this thesis was defended, “Najla Alhariri”, a Saudi
woman, drove her children to school herself. She was home with two cars and no
driver to take her children to school; therefore, she decided to take them herself.
According to the BBC news (Buchanan, 2011), she holds two driving licenses from
Egypt and Lebanon where she lived for many years. The feedback was astonishing,
Saudi women praised her and considered her a hero. Supporters of such a move
created a Facebook group in which many Saudi and non Saudi women honored her.
Her Twitter page was filled with tweets from hundreds of women who admired her
and promised to follow her steps soon. According to Alhariri, the revolutions taking
place in the Middle East urged her to do so (global voices, 2011). She also said that
not being stopped nor arrested encouraged her to continue driving.

V.

Gang Rape Incident:
The story of the Qatif girl shocked the Saudi community as well as the

international arena. As a 16 year old teenager, she got involved in a relationship with
a man who took many pictures of her. Later when she turned 18 years old and married
another man, she wanted to take back the pictures her ex boyfriend took out of
scandal fear. On the day they agreed to meet, her ex boyfriend along with other 6 men
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kidnapped and raped her over 14 times. At first she was accused of adultery as she
went to meet a non relative man and was sentenced to 90 lashes; but then when she
and her lawyer raised the matter to the global media to gain sympathy, the judges
raised the charges to 200 lashes.
Abdul Rahman Allahem, the Qatif girl’s lawyer has been suspended for
talking to the media about the case. His statements have caused an international
outcry and criticism to the Saudi government. He has been known for his
controversial cases he takes. He is a chief defender of women’s rights in Saudi
Arabia. In 2006, he defended the couple who were forced to divorce because of the
wife’s brothers. The wife and husband have been living happily until her brothers
disapproved of his tribal and ethnic affiliation and forced their sister to separate (The
Guardian, 2007).
The story was covered differently by different media. For example, the local
coverage focused on the Saudi people's reaction who approved the punishment.
According to the “Arab News” editor Rasheed Abou- Alsamh, some Saudis approve
of her being lashed because of her meeting with a stranger. However, most of them
believe that she has been through enough suffering and pain (The Guardian, 2007).
The gang rape she went through is enough of a punishment to her and so her charges
should be dropped.
International coverage was different. Most of the countries’ officials and
citizens were shocked by the judgment and expressed their disappointment on the
international media. As the Canadian National Post (2007) reported, Hilary Clinton
aggressively asked Bush during his presidential years to contact King Abduallah and
intervene in the gang rape incident. She called for the drop of the cruel sentence. She
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said that if she to be elected she would put human rights as America’s top priority role
all over the world.
Though the United States showed little criticism to the Qatif girl’s sentence,
Canada reported its protest to the Saudi authorities. Canada’s Minister Josse Verner,
who is in charge with women’s condition and status, said that Canada has formally
showed its disapproval to those in charge (The Globe, 2007). It also described the
charges as barbaric.
CNN interviewed the Qatif girl’s husband who said that the judges saw her as
a guilty person before the hearing. Moreover, judges were mean to her and
disregarded the criminals’ gestures and looks to her. Human Rights Watch researcher
Farida Deif, who interviewed the Qatif girl, confirmed that one of the rapists filmed
the gang rape. The victim and her lawyer tried using the film as evidence to the
assault; but the judges refused (Eltahawy, 2007).
Since the international coverage of the incident was more visible and had a
greater effect, Saudi's administration had to react to calm the international outcry. As
the Birmingham Evening Mail newspaper mentioned, a statement from the Justice
Ministry was released to calm the international anxiety about the gang raped girl. The
statement confirmed that the girl confessed her adultery. According to them, she said
that she has had an affair with one of the rapist while she was married. The Ministry’s
statement intended to show the “truth” about the Qatif girl and refute the “false”
information portrayed in the media about the unjust condition of Saudi women.
Moreover, the King of Saudi Arabia pardoned the victim’s case. The level of stress,
humiliation and torture the victim went through is an enough punishment, said the
King. The Qatif girl and her husband were relieved, but this does not assure relief
from the social humiliation (The Globe, 2007).
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The New York Times (2007) reports claim that the Qatif girl’s brother has
been trying to kill her after the rape to wash out the family’s honor. Abdul Mohsen
Alakkas, the social affairs minister, said that many accused Saudi women fear their
relatives’ reactions to crimes they committed to the extent that many of them refuse to
depart the prison by the end of their sentence. His ministry has been offering shelters
and houses to those of similar cases. He confirmed that Qatif girl will be offered that
if she asked for one (The New York Times, 2007).

VI.

Marriage:
When it comes to marriage and divorce, some believe that Saudi women have

power in their relationships with their husbands to be or with their current spouses
while others think otherwise. For example, Saudi researcher Soraya Al Torki (1977)
claims that women in Saudi enjoy supreme power in family organizations. To prove
this she carries field research on Jeddah elite societies in the issues of marriage, travel
and education. According to her, marriages in Saudi give power to women more than
men in many cases. Power here means the capability of affecting others’ behaviors as
well as maneuvering negotiations to satisfy their own preferences. Sex segregation in
Saudi allows the mothers and sisters of the groom to mingle with the future candidate
brides rather than the fathers or the grooms themselves. Therefore, the women deliver
the information they wish to transmit to the grooms. The groom trusts the mother’s
view of the bride since she is the only one from his family to see and interact with her.
If the mother thinks that the girl would make a good daughter in law, she would
“sweet talk” about the bride’s beauty, charisma and good qualities and vice versa. The
mother’s opinion is formed according to her own view of the bride rather than her
son’s and so she imposes her own preference over his. Although sometimes in Saudi
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communities the father of the groom gives a range of potential families, the mother
still has the power to manipulate information and narrow the range to those who make
up obedient daughters in law. Moreover, the brides enjoy much more power than
assumed. Though they cannot go out and choose their husbands, they can refuse a
certain proposal. They have the veto power and they use it well.
In her book, Samiyah Alkhashab (1989), she interviewed 450 female students
in King Abdel Aziz University in Jeddah. Results showed that Saudi university girls
can choose their husbands and they actually search for certain qualities. They prefer
marrying a person who is not a widow or divorced and of the same nationality but of a
higher education level than theirs. Younger women generations were more supportive
of women’s work and financial contribution to the house expenses. When asked to
rank certain qualities according to importance, personality ranked as most important
followed by emotional chemistry, educational level, family, status in the society and
wealth as the least important.
Other media viewed Saudi women as suppressed and disregarded when it
comes to their marriages. Their fathers or male guardians have the say in whom they
marry or whom they do not marry. Divorce carries its miseries too for the Saudi
women. Therefore, women suffer both before and after their marriages.
For example, as the Gazette newspaper reported (2009), the 50 year old man
who married the 9 year old girl. According to Ahmed Al Mohi, religious scholar,
there is no specific age for Islamic marriage; but the father or guardian has the right to
marry off his daughter in the time he chooses. Hence, though the mother rejected the
marriage, the girl got married with her father’s approval. Although Al Mohi sees
marriage as a way to secure the young girls’ futures, a wife can reject the marriage
contract when she reaches puberty (The Gazette, 2009).
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Another striking setback in the women’s condition in Saudi was released
when a Saudi judge said that it is acceptable for a husband to slap his wife if she
wasted his money extravagantly (The Boston Globe, 2009). Judge Hamad Al Razine
(2009) mentioned to the Arab News that if a woman spent most of her husband’s
salary on buying useless branded clothes for herself then she deserves a slap from her
husband.
As highlighted by Asia News reports (2007), Saudis also face many
difficulties when wanting to marry a non Saudi. According to the intermarriage law of
Saudi, the non Saudi partner has to meet a certain criteria set by the government:
having acceptable nationality and religion (must be Muslim). A permission is needed
from the Interior Affairs Ministry before the marriage which in turn ensures that the
desired partner meet the set criteria. However, Saudi women face many more
challenges pre and post their marriage than Saudi men do. Pre marriage permission is
harder for women to get than it is for men. Almost any Saudi man can get the
permission if his non Saudi partner meets the criteria. They may also marry non
Muslims. On the other hand, not every woman’s proposal is accepted and the non
Saudi partner must be Muslim. Men may also pass their nationality to their foreign
wives and children while Saudi women cannot. Women who are divorced or passed a
certain age, i.e. 30, have better chances in approving their proposals.
Saudi Divorce Forum in Dammam was the first meeting where Saudi women
talked about the problems they face during and after their divorces. According to
Caryle Murphy’s reports (2008), around 150 women gathered in the auditorium with
one aim in mind: helping the divorced women legally, socially and psychologically.
In a community like Saudi, women are heavily blamed for their failed marriages. This
tears down the feelings of the divorcee and makes her blame herself too. Legally,
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women have no right to speak or resort to the courts without their male guardians and
since they are divorced they seek their fathers’ help back to voice them out. However,
by the time they are divorced, the fathers have either passed away or ashamed of the
fact that their daughters are divorced and so divorced women remain voiceless and
helpless. In the forum, women shared their experiences and discussed ways to help
themselves. Luluah Al Shammari claimed that the divorce rates are rising since men
in Saudi are brought up to think that they are the masters of the house and they must
control everything in it including their wives. Refusing to be treated as a property,
women seek divorce from controlling husbands. Psychologically and socially,
divorced women are treated differently. Families look at them as a source of shame
and fear that related unmarried girls would have fewer chances of marriage proposals.
Their female friends do not like to be associated with them and their husbands and
parents would actually ban them from seeing their divorced friends. The society as a
whole would look down upon them.

VII. Guardianship:
Having a male companion when performing any basic routine in Saudi, is a
must. The husband, father, uncle or brother guardianship over their women is
negatively covered by the media.
After Human Rights Watch based in New York interviewed 100 Saudi
women, it concluded that male guardian enforced in the kingdom put them in misery
as they cannot pursue their lives as they wish to. As reported by Lara Setrakian
(2008), male guardians deprive them of their freedom, hinder their education process
and limit their marriage options as well as careers. According to the guardian law in
Saudi, women are part of their father, husband or closest male relative custody while
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divorcees or widows are under their sons’ charge. Wajeda El Huwaider, one of the
women interviewed, talked furiously about her 17 year old son. She wondered how
government trusts her teenage son more than they trust her. She has to take his
permission before travelling, working, or even having a surgery. Saudi women strive
for protection from their men and officials. Legally, women above the age of forty
five do not need permission from their male guardian to travel; but airport personnel
insist on seeing the document (Economist, 2008). Moreover, women may work only if
their husbands or fathers allow them. Girls can be forced to marry since only the
fathers’ approval counts (Almohamed, 2007).
According to the Human Rights Watch (2008), Saudi government does not
want to jeopardize the men’s control over their women; hence, they forgo women’s
basic rights. Women cannot take actions independently when it comes to their
children’s futures. They cannot enroll them, ask for their schooling documents, open
account for them or even travel with them without her husband’s presence or written
permission.
As journalist Aber Mishkhas says, every time Saudi women are one step
ahead, an invisible force drags them back. They managed to get personal IDs
independently but their male guardian has to give his approval, they can have
independent passports, but a male guardian has to permit the travel and yes they now
own businesses but the male guardian’s approval in any action is a mandatory.
Governmental work is also of male’s tasks since women are not permitted to do so
unless accompanied by male guardian or dealing with female-only government
departments which are not a lot (Theodoulou, 2003).
Belonging to such a closed community, Saudi women suffer from domestic
abuse and sexual harassment. Men hit their wives with no cases reported out of social
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and physical fear. Sexual harassment cases are very common in Saudi starting from
fathers to relatives (Almohamed, 2007). Unfortunately, when women resorted to
court, men were not punished or received light sentence while women either received
severe punishments from the court or the society. A famous case of the thirty year old
woman who was shot by her husband proves that Saudi women need protection in
their country. The wife was shot twice by her husband, but she refused to report him
since the court would ask for a male guardian to speak for her. She had no male
guardian other than her husband. And so, having not reported, she was killed by the
third time he shot her (Economist, 2008).
On the other hand, some saw hope and change in the guardian rules.
According to the Women’s International Network News (2000), the rules became less
rigid in many ways. In end of the year 1999, Prince Ahmed gave women the right to
hold their own identity cards separate from those of their fathers or husbands. Prince
Ahmed, interior minister, mentioned that women will no longer need to carry around
photocopies of their male guardians’ IDs since they will be granted one of their own
(Women’s International Network News, 2000). Also, Reuters lately reported that
Saudi women can now check in hotels and stay on their own without the need for a
male’s signature or even presence. Such a matter may be a right taken for granted in
most countries; but in Saudi where women cannot dinner alone, it is considered a
major reform.

VIII. Saudi Women in the Cinema:
On a recent “American Dad” animated cartoon aired on Fox, an alien started
living with this American family. When the daughter decided to take the alien for a
walk on the beach, she dressed the alien a full cover-up from head to toe that only the
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alien’s eyes can show. The alien was upset and said “you don't have to dress me like a
Saudi woman to take me to the beach”; the daughter then replied by saying “this was
the only way, I don't want my friends to see you”.
Attending a movie in a cinema or a theatre is taken for granted by many
westerns or even Arabs; however, Saudi has no theatres. Saudis either travels miles
out of their country to watch the movie or watch it on TV or rent/buy the DVD to
watch a film. Saudi’s neighbor country “Bahrain” is always filled with Saudis coming
on weekends to catch a movie. Movies rented or sold in the country are censored from
any offensive words, actions or sexual attempts before put on display; in fact, many
movies do not make it into the Kingdom for its excessive sexual or political display.
Many movies, from different nationalities, portray Saudis in either a negative
or positive way. What matters is that these films, scenes or event one minute shots
watched affects the viewers’ perception of Saudis. For example in Egyptian movies,
Saudi men are mostly portrayed as rich fat men sitting in a bar and throwing tons of
money on the belly dancer. The Egyptian movie “Seventh Sense” showed an image of
a Saudi man watching the news with his four face covered wives and ten children.
Being exposed to such images over a long period of time, a person’s perception is
more likely to be affected by the constant images he/she views.
Below, some foreign and Saudi movies are analyzed.

a) Foreign Movies:
i. Death of a Princess:
This 1980 British produced film is about one of Saudi’s princesses who was
executed along with her lover by her family for the crime of adultery. At the
beginning of the film, scenes of Saudi princesses cruising their cars in the streets of
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Riyadh in search for men are shown. The Saudi feedback on the film was harsh where
the government actually attempted to stop the screening of the movie in many
countries. To the Saudi citizens, this movie insulted their princesses and accused them
of adultery, driving their cars and with no morals. Under the Saudi pressure, many
countries either banned the movie or wrote an introductory comment before the
beginning of the film ensuring that the meant princess is not Saudi. The actress who
played in the movie “Suzan Abu Taleb” intentionally changed her name after the film
out of fear for her career. She is now known as “Sawsan Badr”.
ii. The Kingdom:
The American movie “The Kingdom” was produced in 2007 and directed by
the American Peter Berg. The series of bombings occurring in Saudi’s compounds
(inhabited by Americans and other nationalities) inspired the creators of the movie.
The film is about an American FBI team coming to Saudi’s capital to investigate on a
bombing and look for the terrorists. Throughout the film, the team stops many other
terrorists’ attacks committed by Saudis against Americans and foreigners living in
Saudi’s compounds.
Through the director’s lens, viewers get a glimpse on Saudi women.
Throughout the film, images of Saudi women fully covered from head to toe are
constantly shown. In many shots women are seen walking in groups behind men.
Even “Mayes”, the only female in the FBI team, was forced to wear the abaya as soon
as she entered the Kingdom. The gym in one of the compounds was where the FBI
team slept. The place was set up with a curtain in the middle so that “Mayes” could
sleep away from the men’s beds. Also, when one of the Saudi’s princes invited the
team over dinner, “Mayes” was not invited to the men’s reception gathering because
of her sex.
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iii. Lawrence of Arabia:
The 1962 British film Lawrence of Arabia is about T. E. Lawrence’s
experience in the Arabian Peninsula, i.e. Saudi, during the World War one. One of
the scenes gave a glimpse of Arabian women. When Lawrence went to meet one of
the tribes’ leaders in his tent; women come in carrying trays of food and fruits.
Women, of course, completely body and face covered rush to exist the tent where a
strange man is present. All the women in the tents surrounding the leader’s tent were
also hiding away from the strange man; however, since Lawrence looks different than
any other man in their tribe, women sneak a look at him behind the curtains without
being noticed.

b) Saudi Movies:
Many short low budget movies were produced by Saudis to portray the Saudi
life. These movies, being short and low financed, were not watched by many. But
they are still worth to be mentioned as first movie attempts.
Haifa Al Mansor is the first Saudi female director who produced three short
movies. According to her, she received many emails, messages and calls that insulted
her (Rasmussen, 2010). Some actually threatened to kill her; but Haifa remains calm
and continues with her mission. The most famous of them all is the movie “Women
Without Shadows”, which is about the women’s lives inside the Kingdom; how they
dress and live in Saudi. The film was screened in many festivals such as Oman and
Damascus and received many awards. Her new film will also tackle another angle
about women’s life in Saudi.
Her first movie “Who?” was seen by Saudis online. It talked about a male
killer who wears abaya and niqab and knocks at doors. Women allow him in thinking
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that he is one of their female friends; then he kills them and steals their money. Saudis
objected to Al Mansor’s view on the official “Islamic” Saudi dress code. For that, she
raised a lot of hate against her.
Another short film by Mohammed Al Khalif is being produced now. But Al
Khalif is struggling to find a Saudi woman who agrees to star his movie. The Film is
called “Garbage Bag” and it is about a Saudi woman who gets stuck in a public
bathroom since her abaya was stolen. The movie shows her struggle inside the
restroom until she turns a garbage bag to an abaya and finally leaves the bathroom.
According to Faiza Ambah (2009), Khalif and many other are part of a group called
“Talashi” or “Fade Out” whose mission is questioning their country’s strictness along
with passion and love for film production.
Abdallah Al Mohessein’s “Cinema 500 km” and “Oppression of Silence” are
two Saudi short movies. The first is about a Saudi man’s journey to Bahrain to attend
a movie theatre while the second is about government oppression.
Though there exist market for film production, only two long big budget
movies were produced: Keif el Hal (How are you?) and Menahi. The cast in both
movies were not fully Saudis and parts or most of the films were shot out of the
Kingdom to avoid strict regulations.

i. Keif Al Hal:
This comedy is about a Saudi family torn between Saudi tradition and
modernity. The film is the first long big budget Saudi movie. It was produced by
Rotana and shot in Dubai. Director of the movie is a Palestinian with a Canadian
passport and the script writers are an Egyptian and a Lebanese. Actors were Saudi,
Jordanian, Syrian, Kuwaiti, but it was starred by the first Saudi female cinema actor
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ever “Hend”. Hend Mohammed’s voice is recognized by many Saudis since she has
always worked in the radio stations and on animated translated cartoons, but this
movie is the first film that shows her face to the population.
The movie was shown in the “Cannes Film Festival” and watched by many
westerns. Saudis were able to watch the movie in many Arab countries’ theatres such
as Cairo, Dubai and Bahrain. Showtime also aired the movie for a prepaid fee. The
movie is about a girl “Mais Hemdan” who struggles with her family. She works as a
journalist behind their back out of fear. She also falls in love with her cousin who
works as a director. Her brother, tries marrying her off to one of the fundamentalists
as he objects to the cousin’s “western evil” lifestyle. A tension between the family is
felt throughout the movie. For example, during their vacation in Dubai, the daughter
takes off her abaya and headscarf and wears jeans with a top. The father does not
mind while her brother objects.
Saudi’s negative side is slightly portrayed in this movie in a comic way. For
example, one of the actors keeps annoying a woman (covered from head to toe).
Finally when he threw his number to her (an old Saudi technique that has been used
by men when trying to approach women), he finds out that the woman is his mother's
friend.
The creators of the movie were very careful about not offending any Saudi
tradition or taboo. They intended to show the good and less good side of the Saudi
family. At the end of the movie the fundamentalist brother agrees to marry his sister
to their director cousin.
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ii. Menahi:
Menahi is the second long movie produced in 2009 by Rotana. The movie is a
comedy about a Saudi man’s first journey out of the Kingdom. This film is special
because it was watched by Saudis not in nearby countries nor on TV; however, they
watched it in movie theatres in their own country. For the first in many decades,
Saudis were able to watch a movie in a theatre in the Kingdom. Men, boys and girls
up to 10 or 12 were allowed to attend; but women and girls older than 13 could not.
Opening a theatre caused some chaos in the Kingdom where many
conservative Saudis objected to the idea. Groups of men gathered in front of the
theatres trying to prevent the audience from entering, other Islamic clerics lectured,
during prayer times, the people about the “evil” cinemas and how Islam forbids these
gatherings (Abu Nasr, 2009). Fayz Al-Malki, the lead actor of the movie, said that he
received many calls and messages from angry Saudis who cursed him and accused
him of spreading evil, but he insists that Islam does not forbid movies that are free
from any sexual content.

IX.

Television:
Saudi women were never allowed to work in Television; then they were only

allowed to work behind the cameras. Up until the former Saudi information minister
Iyad Madani (2009) allowed women to work behind and in front of the camera. They
interviewed men and they hosted many programs. Though they showed their faces,
head veils were a must in the Saudi TV. Not all the media focused on the huge change
in the history of Saudi; but many covered and portrayed the criticisms the minister
went through for taking such a decision.
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For example, one of the Sheikhs mentioned that women can use satellite
channels to teach Islam and Sahri’a to other women. He said that they can take off
their face veil; but must keep their abayas and head veils. Soon after the release of
such a statement, Sheikh Al Fawzan fought against the idea claiming that even the
women’s voices is an awra; i.e. should not be seen or heard by any male except
mahram (El Youssef, 2004).
As journalist Asmaa Almohamed (2007) confirms, Saudi women do not just
appear in the media every day. Even if the society accepts women’s achievements in
different fields, they are still not ready to see them in TV shows or newspapers.
Women of the royal family also have limited media coverage over them. Only in
2005, Princess Loulwa, King Faisal’s daughter, got huge media coverage over her
presence along with other Saudi women delegates in foreign trade conference.
Sohaylah Hammad (1984) sees women who work in the media as sinful
victims of the media. To her, they are not improving but moving backwards even
further since they are only readers of lines written by other men. She sees no good in
women revealing their faces and wearing tons of makeup over them. If a woman
wishes to work in the media then her role should only be behind the camera and not
exceed writing stories or gathering information. She believes that other non media
jobs that Islam approves would be teaching and nursing.
Moreover, England’s Leicester University’s Professor Atif Nassif (2008)
conducted a content analysis of Saudi Arabia’s advertisements aired on Saudi’s
terrestrial channel one. Saudi’s media is very much controlled by the government and
any advertisement aired, must be approved by the government which follow the
Islamic Shari’a law. Therefore, Saudi marketers and advertisers face a difficulty in
promoting their brand within the Islamic and culture restrictions. However, it has to
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be noted that Saudi’s advertising expenditure is one of the largest and most rapid
growing of the world. The sample analyzed included 164 ads aired between May and
April in the years 2000 and 2001. In general, results showed that men leads
outnumbered women in ads aired in Saudi. Men appeared more in leisure ads while
women were mostly performing household related ads. If the ad had a female lead, the
setting would prevalently take place indoors (living room, kitchen or hair salons for
instance); while male leads ads would normally have an outdoor setting (desert,
garden, restaurant…etc). Moreover, male voiceovers were more common in Saudi
Arabia. Overall, gender stereotyping is strongly felt in Saudi adverts where women
only act the personal and house care and men act all the rest such as beverage,
bookstores, restaurants…etc. (Nassif, 2008).

X.

Human Rights Watch:
Human Rights Watch has been very critical of Saudi when dealing with its

women. The HRW critisicim has been heavily portrayed in the media.
For example, the United Nations’ anti discrimination committee concluded
that according to past incidents and present laws, women are in need of more
protection and less discrimination. However, the Saudi officials claimed that there
exists no discrimination against Saudi women (Harrison, 2008).
Though Saudi officials say that they abolished some of the rules concerning
women, such as male signed permission or presence for women travelling or even
receiving health care, Human Rights Watch confirms its existence. HRW reported
that doctors require the presence of a male guardian or else they would not treat the
female patients. The doctors interviewed by the HRW personals said that when
women appear without a male guardian, they must be reported to the police who in
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turn force them to refuse treating or discharging them until a guardian comes. Al
Watan newspaper (2008) backs up HRW’s report when it released interviews with
some Saudi doctors who said that the Health Ministry still obliges them to ask for a
guardian’s presence or permission.
Human

rights

watchdog

2008’s

report

condemned

the

continuous

discrimination against women. According to the report, Saudi officials forgo women’s
rights to sustain the male control and power. Data collected from almost 100
interviews show that women have no control over their children’s lives nor theirs
(The Guardian, 2008).
Creating women’s unions and support groups is beneficial for helping Saudi
women. However, as Nora Pharaon (2004) mentioned that women’s unions,
associations and other groups are not acceptable in Saudi unless they have a charity
cause. Women self improving and empowerment groups are forbidden, for instance.
However, women from the royal family took the initiative in the 80s and started
forming charitable groups that helped disabled handicapped children, poor women
and those in need. They stayed away from politics and controversial issues and did
not cross the line (Pharaon, 2004).

XI.

Women's Satisfaction:
Media has portrayed Saudi women's dissatisfaction with their condition. For

example, a rare study was conducted by Salwa Al Khatib in 2006 proved Saudi
women's suicide cases reported are much higher than those of men; 96 and 4
respectively. Reasons for women suicide reported vary between forced marriage
arrangements, lack of family communication, closed community sufferings and the
life style of the average Saudi women in general (Hassan, 2007).
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In Heinrichsdorff Bagader’s book (1998), he chose a selection of stories that
were written by Saudi writers and represent their frustrations. For example, a story by
Najat Khayyat titled “Had I Been Male” tackles arranged forced marriages in Saudi.
Another story by Wafa Munawwar titled “The Duties of a Working Mother” deals
with Saudi working mothers and wives. The story shows her busy life schedule
between her job, house, husband, children’s home works and their sports and dentist
appointments. Although she lacks a good rest and sleep, she refuses to give up the
career she loves. Hence, the story shows the life of working mothers in Saudi where
no man is willing to help with the housework or even children. Another story by Amal
Abdul Hamid titled “In a Puzzling Whirlwind” revolves around women infertility in
Saudi. Since women are seen as child bearers, the society does not tolerate those who
are incapable of carrying one. Furthermore, “The Reflection” by Khayriyyah asSaqqaf talks about girls running away from their houses hoping for a better life.
To escape her loneliness and boredom, she accepted marrying the first man knocking
on their door. Though she found him very repulsive, she married him.
However, when other media spoke to Saudi women, they expressed their
satisfaction and happiness with their status in the society. A project by BBC and BBC
Arabia (2005) jointly took a deeper look into the lives of young female Arabs. They
spoke to the women of Jeddah who struggle to have their voices listened to. Quotes
from these women represent a side of Saudi that has been ignored by the media. The
project called “My Life” asks the women of what they would be doing or achieved by
2015. Hasna sees herself owning a publishing house while Rotana and Abla want to
be in a position where they can prove that Saudi women are smart and ambitious.
Rosana sees herself as a happy stay home wife and mother since this is the ultimate
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happiness for her. “My Life” represented a happy satisfied side of the Saudi women
whether they decided to work or stay home.
Moreover, the idea of suppressed Saudi women is a myth to researcher
Delinda Hanley (2001) since almost every Saudi woman she met expressed her
happiness and satisfaction. She came across successful journalists, doctors, business
women, teachers and principals. According to Dr. Thoraya Ahmed, director of the
UN’s Population Fund, Saudi women must be responsible for proving the myth wrong
and changing the stereotype.
As part of the USA’s public diplomacy programs, Karen Hughes was
responsible for spreading the message of the American to the Arab world. In Saudi,
she met almost 500 women in one of the universities ballrooms. As she talked about
the Saudi Muslim women frustrations of not being able to vote, drive or take part of
the society, most of the audience challenged her (Weisman, 2005). In fact, one of the
women stood up and talked about how happy Saudi women are with their position in
the society; heartfelt applauses followed her statements. New York Times conducted
several interviews with members of the audience to talk about their feedback which
was not what Hughes or her aides predicted. Professor Nadia Jambi said furiously that
she was not banned from talking to the other sex. She interacts with men in
conferences, streets, supermarkets, malls and at work. Dr. Siddiqa Kamal, on the other
hand talked about her passionless desire for driving cars. She said that we, Saudi
women, do not want to drive cars around the Kingdom. Her daughter added that Saudi
women have more rights than men and than any other foreign women. Nour El
Sabbagh, a student, mentioned that she loves the abaya she wears. She also wondered
why westerns believe that they are enforced to wear them when Saudis love their
abayas and wear them contentedly (Weisman, 2005).
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Though non-Saudis view abayas that Saudi women wear as one of the
government’s ways of suppression, women have no problems with it as Peyman
Pejman reported (2004). Saudi women have been brought up in a conservative society
that demands body and hair coverage since girls’ puberty or even before it. The way
women value Islamic traditions create no room for abaya discussion. For example,
Mohsen al-Awaji is considered one of the most liberal Islamic activists who approve
women carrying their own identification cards, driving and voting; but he is strictly
against women abandoning their abayas (Pejman, 2004).
Saudi women consider themselves as the luckiest women on earth. They are
very proud of their condition and status in the society and perceive their nation as the
closest to ideal Islamic country where western values have no room to grow. In
Riyadh’s Maimouna Center, almost 500 women gathered for their veil defense as
Faiza Ambah reported (2006). The lecturers, Mashael Eissa and Afrah Humaydi, gave
speeches on women’s responsibilities to God and their religion. They called for the
protection of their veil and abaya and they urged women to dress their daughters
modestly and raise them according to Islam’s demands. Eissa fought against the
Western values in any form and asked the women to do so as well. Even if the
government or people allow us to deal with men for instance, we will not because
God is watching us, she mentioned. Our pure Islamic nation and our love for God is
greater than any western influence.
Many Saudi women are rising up and becoming pioneers in different fields to
substitute for the absence years. No other nation was able to match the success of
Saudi women in the past couple of years (Saud, 2009). For example, Ghada Ba’aqeel
has recently been elected as the world’s best female business for her noticeable
achievements in establishing successful businesses for women in the Kingdom. Hayat
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Sindi was also internationally rewarded for her academic research and medical
invention. Sindi and her team successfully created a device called “Diagnostic For
All” that helps in making medical tools cheaper in price, smaller in size; hence
available. Pediatrician Howaida Al Qethamy was selected as the number one pediatric
doctor in the Middle East and the second world wide. Soraya Al Torki is an
anthropology professor known for her numerous research and lectures in top
universities such as George Washington and American University in Cairo (Saud,
2009).
Elizabeth Scharpf (2007) interviewed three of the most famous women in
Saudi: Lama Al Sulaiman, Nashwa Taher and Basmah Omair. The first two are the
first Saudi women to run in elections and win seats in the “Jeddah Chamber of
Commerce and Industry” while the latter is the president of Khadija bent Khouwalid
foundation. The three women along with other active women wanted to act upon the
obstacles and problems women in Saudi face; hence, they met with Prince Abdel
Majid, who is also Mecca governor. After their meeting, the Prince put together a
committee of 18 women to work on the obstacles and problems raised. After three
years, the Khadija bent Khouwalid foundation was established. At first, the center
trained women who intend to open up new businesses or improve existing ones. Later,
the center opened up a new department named government files. This department was
responsible for examining laws and regulations that hindered women in any area.
These reports were then presented to ministries in charge.
Al Sulaiman and Taher said that when the King approved women running for
the elections, they were thrilled. They were almost certain they would never make it
to the chamber; however, they insisted on taking the chance and started a campaign.
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Their campaign focused on women empowerment, support and most importantly
creating opportunities for women and removing obstacles they face.

XII. Positive Changes Occurring:
Siham Al Suwaigh (1989) conducted a research in the city of Dammam where
she wanted to analyze the attitude toward women role in Saudi. The researcher chose
personal interviews method with women of three different neighborhoods to represent
different socioeconomic classes and age groups. Results showed change in many
areas: family relations, marriage, education and employment. In all the
neighborhoods, the younger generations have shown increase in the number of
nuclear families, decline in arranged marriages, increase in unarranged marriages and
a decrease in polygamy. Younger generations have also shown higher educational
levels in general; but the higher the socio economic class, the more schooling is
encouraged. The interviews confirmed that younger generation women were more
welcomed to work in full time jobs. Number of unemployed women has noticeably
declined between the two generations.
Political change was noticed in the year 2005 when the Jeddah Chamber of
Commerce entered the history when it gave the chance to 17 Saudi women to run for
the board elections (Ambah, 2005). Even if they lose elections, female candidates
regarded themselves winners since they took part of this historic elections. Turnout
for women voters was as low as 10%; but this percentage was not expected in the
conservative Saudi community. Female candidates went through the full elections
experience; they gave presentations, debates and ran a full campaign which touched
upon the fact that as women candidates they know exactly the obstacles
businesswomen face in the Saudi society.
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Socially, change was seen and felt around and within the women themselves.
For example, for the first time in Saudi, the government announced a conference that
targeted women related issues and concerns in 2003 (Ambah, 2004). The public
poured in documents with proposals, requests and worries. Lecturer Fatima Nassef
along with 32 other women collected a seven page long document that talked about
the unfair after divorce laws such as child custody. Other documents included work
related matters. Lack of job opportunities was not the concern in focus, but the
logistical aspect of working: women cannot drive and fear of public transportation.
Another document included complains of 150 women about the judicial performance
such as supporting victim women, insisting on having a male guardian and in general
the women’s lack of awareness of their rights. As reported by Faiza Ambah (2004),
this conference shows the one of the most significant attempts to develop the
women’s status in Saudi Arabia where women freely discuss their problems and
challenges they face and try to solve them. Officials listen to them rather than hearing
from men appointed by the government.
Furthermore, even though domestic abuse is strictly forbidden in Islam, it is
very common to the Saudi community. In the past, cases reported are minimal due to
the fear of public humiliation and scandals. However, with the Kingdom developing,
more women have been able to speak up and regain their rights. For example, the
famous case of Rania El Baz. She was abused and beaten aggressively by her spouse.
Her photos lying on the hospital’s bed with a battered face and broken arms was
spread on the internet and published in newspapers. The court did not support her nor
defended her rights. But El Baz acted differently than the abused women who
remained silent about their abuse. She broke the social taboo and spoke up in different
media about her condition (Ambah, 2004). Finally, El Baz’s husband was sentenced
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to 300 lashes and 6 months to be spent in prison. Rania El Baz challenged her
society’s norms and traditions by talking publicly about her abuse. She allowed the
Saudi as well as the foreign media to publish pictures of her scared faces lying down
the hospital bed.
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Chapter 4: Methodology
I. Significance of the Study:
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has come forward as one of the most
economically well established countries in the region and the rest of the world. Its
large oil resources as well as rapidly growing industrial power have furthered its
strength and importance. Moreover, September 11th incident has further increased the
spot light on the Kingdom since almost 15 of the plane hijackers were Saudis. These
factors increased the curiosity of the people to know more about the Kingdom and its
citizens. Hence, the media replied to this curiosity with more media attention on the
Kingdom (Mishra, 2007). Being a popular topic, the Saudi women were also focused
upon.
Not all the media portrayed the good side of the Kingdom; however, many of
them focused on the negative issues rather than the good or even just facts. In her
book, Sohayla Hammad (1984) says that with the constant media’s negative portrayal
of Saudi women, they became discouraged and weakened. Women started having
doubts about causes of such backwardness and began believing in the western culture
and wishing for the western women’s lifestyle. Being a diversified nation, this
negative portrayal has, on the other hand, increased the defensiveness of other
women. They believed more in their message and fought harder against foreign
influence.
Significance of the study:


Saudi women issues have been tackled before but such angle has not yet
been touched upon. Though one might expect to find a lot of readings
and studies on Saudi women, literature found was limited and sort of
small.
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Due to the global media, the usual image of a Saudi woman is usually a
frustrated housewife, mother of minimum 5 kids, victim of polygamy
and early marriage, uneducated, unemployed, walking in cattle and
covered from head to toe in black. Therefore, this study is meant to
show the role of global media in creating stereotypes whether they are
true or not. For example, though non-Saudis view abayas that Saudi
women wear as one of the government’s ways of suppression, women
have no problems with it as Peyman Pejman reported (2004).



The topic could show that the influence of global media is greater on the
viewer’s side rather than the topic or person meant. For example, Saudi
women do not acknowledge or admit the frustrations they are into. They
look at themselves as pioneers and happy to be close to the pure and
ideal Islamic women.



This study can show the strong effect of global media and how it shapes
the perceptions and opinions of its viewers.



Show whether media people frame subjects according to their own idea
of them. Since there is an uneven flow of information in the media,
usually one voice is loudly heard and rules over others; that is the voice
of the core countries with stronger media and larger audience. For
example, BBC news declared in 2005 that more than half of the
graduates in Saudi are women; however, they only make up to 5% of
workforce. They did not focus on the fact that Saudi women are going to
schools but they gave attention to the inequality in job opportunities. If it
had been stated in a Saudi media for instance, they would have
celebrated the equality in education.
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Since Television is an important form, its effects on the audience remain
powerful. According to Severin & Tankard (2001), it is of great
importance to media persons to assess the effect of any medium on the
public for many reasons: first, senders are curious about the effect of
their messages; second, receivers are also concerned about the effect of
the mass media on them; third and most important, understanding the
cause effect relationship caused by the media is a rich knowledge that
many strive to figure out.

II. Research Objectives:


Show all the angles of the story. For example, global media shows
disappointment in the fact that Saudi women do not have the right to
vote or participate in political matters, well most men in Saudi cannot
either. Being a Kingdom, gives no room for elections, for instance. Also
the unemployment does not concern Saudi women alone. Thousands of
men and even more cannot find suitable jobs either.



Investigate whether global media show change or not. For example,
when Effat College in Saudi Arabia removed the partisan in the
graduation ceremony for the first time in the history of Saudi and
allowed parents of both genders to witness their graduating daughters
(Mills, 2009). Also, the first sex desegregated university (KAUST) is a
first in the Kingdom. All these changes are not as focused upon and
portrayed as the negative matters such as the Qatif girl’s incident.



See whether the global media have a role in directing the focus of the
viewers. For example, a huge fuss was created over Saudi women's
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driving by the media. People were guided to think that all the Kingdom’s
problems would be solved if only women are driving cars.


Show whether the role of global media in the globalized world is as it is
assumed to be. Does or does not the ideal global “village” exist in true
life. Many factors may hinder the global media’s task such as the uneven
flow of information, ownership of media and other problems on the
viewers’ sides such as selectivity and prior information.



Look deeply whether the media have a constant frame of the Saudi
women. Not only this, but whether media people also prime issues over
others such in the case of the unemployed Saudi women. For example,
not having a right to work was primed over the fact that the numbers of
Saudi women university graduates are increasing rapidly. According to
Mahmoud Saleh (1986) mentioned, higher education expenditure per
student in Saudi is one of the largest ones in the world.

III. Statement of the Problem and Main Thesis:
The portrayal of Saudi women in the global media affects the way Egyptians
perceive them. Newscasts as well as entertainment TV present the Saudi women’s
struggle with the norms, traditions and governmental laws as well as religion. Cases
of Saudi women not having the rights to speak, vote, work, drive, learn or even to
have a role in the society are heavily portrayed which influence the way Egyptians
perceive them. However, Saudis of both genders have their own idea of the Saudi
women that is not a result of the global media but a consequence of a Saudi Arabian
way of bringing up. To them, the terms of “restrictions” and “struggle” does not go
with the nature of the Saudi women; they are actually “pretty happy” as 500 women
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declared in a conference in a respectable Saudi university as mentioned in the New
York Times (2005).

IV. Population and Sample:
This study focuses on the perceptions and views of two different populations;
thus two samples exist for the purpose of this study: Egyptian and Saudi. The
researcher will survey 200 participants from both samples for analysis.
Since complete lists and demographics of both populations are unavailable,
non-probability samples will be used where no mathematical guidelines are followed.
The type of sampling for both populations used in this study would be purposive,
where the two samples have to meet certain criteria. First, participants from both
groups have to watch TV for at least one hour per week. Second, Egyptian
participants living in Saudi or having travelled there would be excluded from the
sample to ensure that their perception is not based on their true experience in Saudi.
Those who have only travelled for Hajj or Omra will be included since their
experiences in Mekka or Madina are very limited. They deal with millions from
different countries, they travel in groups based according to their nationality, they
spend most of their time praying and practicing religious activities; therefore their
pilgrimage experience does not affect their TV based perception. On the other hand,
those travelling for short periods, for a conference for instance, will be included in the
sample since they get a glimpse of the country during their short stay which either
changes their perceptions or reinforce existing ones. Therefore, the questionnaire will
include filtering questions to ensure that the participants completing the survey are
what the researcher is looking for. In addition, the researcher will be forced to use the
snowball sampling technique in Saudi for a number of reasons. As a female, many
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restrictions will hinder the researcher from reaching Saudi men in many places.
Therefore, male participants will be asked to help with the distribution of the surveys
to their friends and families. Also, Saudi's closed communities and strict regulations
will be easier to manage by snowball sampling.
Moreover, this study will target participants who are highly educated and
above the age of 21. Such high education and age levels are chosen so that individuals
are able to form their own opinion, have the right to watch TV without parental
guidance and are educated enough to seek other sources of information. The
perceptions created should not be based on ignorance or low educational levels.
Perceptions should not be a result of illiteracy, inability to understand the news casts
(Arabic or foreign) or lack of access to different sources.

V. Research Questions and Hypotheses:
The study proposed a number of questions to be answered and hypotheses to
be studied.
1) What are the patterns of Television viewership and exposure among
Saudis and Egyptians?
RQ 1.a: Which channels are mostly watched by Egyptians?
RQ 1.b: Which channels are mostly watched by Saudis?
RH 1.a: Egyptians tend to seek foreign and their local (Egyptian) sources when
seeking information about Saudi women.
RH 1.b: Saudis tend to seek their local (Saudi) sources when seeking information
about Saudi women.
RQ 1.c: Do Egyptians seek alternative media than their initial chosen source?
RQ 1.d: Do Saudis seek alternative media than their initial chosen source?
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RQ 1.e: Is the Egyptian audience an active one?
RQ 1.f: Is the Saudi audience an active one?
2) What are the patterns of perception of Saudi and foreign media among
Saudis and Egyptians?
RH 2.a: Egyptians have low knowledge of Saudi movies.
RH 2.b: Saudis have high knowledge of Saudi movies.
RQ 2.a: How do Egyptians perceive Saudi media vs. other media?
RQ 2.b: How do Saudis perceive Saudi media vs. other media?
3) What are the patterns of perceptions of Saudi women among Saudis and
Egyptians?
RH 3.a: Egyptians tend to have a negative perception of Saudi women.
RH 3.b: Saudis tend to have a positive perception of Saudi women.
RQ 3.a: What is the relationship between the amount of TV watched and the Saudi
perception of Saudi women?
RQ 3.b: What is the relationship between the amount of TV watched and the Egyptian
perception of Saudi women?
4) What are the patterns of Television exposure and perceptions of Saudi
women among Saudis and Egyptians?
RQ 4.a: How do foreign media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?
RQ 4.b: How do foreign media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?
RQ 4.c: How do Saudi media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?
RQ 4.d: How do Saudi media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?
RQ 4.e: How do Egyptian media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?
RQ 4.f: How do Egyptian media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?
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VI. Independent and Dependant Variables:
The dependant variable of this study is the perception of Saudi women: the
perception of Egyptian men and women of the Saudi women, the perception of Saudi
men of their women as well as the perception of Saudi women of themselves. In some
cases, Saudi, Egyptian and foreign media are another dependant variable in this study.
However, the study includes a number of independent variables which are:
a) Country/ nationality:
Subjects are either Saudis or Egyptians.
b) Sources/ channels:
Channels and TV sources of information selected, chosen and watched by the subjects
were divided to: local Egyptian, local Saudi and foreign. To the Saudi population, any
sources other than Saudi's channels were considered foreign and to the Egyptian
population, any sources other than Egyptian channels were considered foreign.
c) Exposure, knowledge and impact Level:
i. Level of exposure to Egyptian media, level of exposure to Saudi media and
level of exposure to foreign media.
ii. Hours spent watching TV: mild (1- 4 hours per week), moderate (more than 4
hours per week) and heavy (more than 7 hours per week).
iii. Knowledge about Egyptian media, knowledge about Saudi media and
knowledge about foreign media.
d) TV programs:
i. Fiction vs news.
ii. Channels chosen by each country as well as programs preferred.
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VII.

Pilot Study:

The questionnaire was filled by 10 of each sample. Minor changes were done
for a better comprehension of the survey.

VIII. Data Collection:
The distribution of surveys over both samples was done starting the month of
November. The questionnaires were filled by participants by either filling out a hard
copy of it or a soft copy sent via the internet. Other participants used the questionnaire
posted by the researcher online on "survey monkey". The researcher was available to
answer questions raised by the participants without leading them to any direction;
only clarifications rather than leading. Not living in Saudi, the researcher asked other
trained men and women assistants to help with the distribution and collection of the
surveys. The male assistants were necessary to reach Saudi men while female
assistants reached women. A translated version of the survey was also available at all
times for participants from both samples.
For the Egyptian sample, the questionnaires were distributed in Cairo's
companies, restaurants and hangouts starting the last week of November. However,
because of Saudi's culture and restrictions, questionnaires were distributed in
hospitals, companies and homes.
The difference between both samples was very clear. The Egyptian sample
was much easier to reach and ask to fill a survey. They were familiar with the survey
design and filling process. However, the Saudi sample needed some persuasion before
accepting to fill a questionnaire. Still, many refused to fill them. They expressed fear
and discomfort to the idea of survey. They claimed that they do not feel comfortable
revealing their opinions. Others were offended and refused to fill surveys that aim at
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showing the suppressions of Saudi women, as they believed. Some Saudis were also
offended by some of the questions in the survey and refused to continue the
questionnaire such as "Saudi men prefer their women to be second class citizens" or
other questions related to Islam such as "Islam calls for sex segregation and face veil"
and "please mention who sets the rules for women in Saudi Arabia". Though the
researcher and assistants tried explaining that the survey only aims at revealing their
opinions, they still excused themselves from participating. Hence, Saudi participants
who agreed to fill the survey were asked to help recruiting their friends to participate.

IX. Statistical Technique:
Different statistical techniques have been employed to answer the questions
and hypotheses raised by the study in hand. Techniques will be utilized to measure the
reliability of the scales and questions, summary statistics to verify means and standard
deviations as well as parametic ( t-tests, for instance) and non parametic techniques
such as Chi Square.
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Chapter 5: Results:
After the distribution of the questionnaires on both samples, the researcher
inputted and analyzed the data using the professional data analysis software SPSS.
The research targeted two samples: Saudis and Egyptians. Since the targets
had to meet a certain criteria, a number of questions were placed at the beginning of
the questionnaire to filter respondents. Those Egyptians and Saudis who watch TV for
less than an hour per week were excluded from the sample. Also, Egyptians who have
lived in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or visited it for longer than 10 days were
excluded from the sample to ensure that their opinion is not formed or influenced by
their real life experiences.
Filtering questions were:
a) Have you ever visited Saudi Arabia for any reason other than Hajj or Omra?
b) How long was your visit to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia?
c) Do you watch TV for at least one hour per week?
The researcher also targeted highly educated and high income participants for
a number of reasons. The perceptions created needed to be based on any reason other
than illiteracy, inability to understand the news casts (Arabic or foreign) or lack of
access to different sources. Whether a participant wanted to look for another source,
for instance, or not should be based on his choice rather than his incapability or
inability.
After excluding those who failed to pass the filtering questions, a total of 400
responses were collected where each one successfully met the criteria set.
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I. Sample Description:
A.

Nationality: Out of the 400 respondents, 200 were Saudis and 200

were Egyptians who have either never visited Saudi Arabia or spent 10 or fewer
days there.

B.

Age: No participant under the age of 21 was included in the sample.

The mean age of the Saudi sample was 30.4 years while the Egyptian mean was
27.8 years.
For the Saudi sample, almost 58% (n=109) of Saudis aged between 21 to
under 30, 30% (n=56) aged 30 to under 40 and only 12% (n=23) aged 40 to under 50.
While the Egyptian sample ages were 76% (n=148) for those aging 21 to under 30,
20% (n=40) for those aging 30 to under 40 and 4% (n=7) aged 40 to under 50 years.

Age in years
21-< 30 years
30-< 40 years
40-<50 years
Total
Missing
Mean age in years

Frequency(%)
Saudis
Egyptians
109 (58%)
148 (76%)
56 (30%)
40 (20%)
23 (12%)
7 (4%)
188 (100)
195 (100)
12
30.4
27.8

5

Table 5. 1: Participants' age

C.

Gender: Both genders were targeted for the sake of the research.

Females outnumbered the males in both countries. In the Saudi sample, 62%
(n=120) were females while the males summed up to be a total of 73 participant.
In the Egyptian sample, the females were 64% (n=127) of the total sample while
the rest were males.
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Gender
Male
Female
Total
Missing

Frequency(%)
Saudis
Egyptians
73 (38%)
70 (36%)
120 (62%)
127 (64%)
193 (100)
197 (100)
7
3

Table 5. 2: Participants' gender

D.

Education: In the Saudi sample, the majority of respondents were

currently enrolled in post graduate programs (n=109, 60%), followed by those
who successfully completed their post graduate studies (n=40, 22%) and the
bachelor degree holders (n=34, 19%). In the Egyptian sample, the majority of
respondents were currently enrolled in post graduate programs (n=123, 62%),
followed by the bachelor degree holders (n=42, 21%) and those who successfully
completed their post graduate studies (n=32, 16%).
Level of education
Bachelor degree holder
Graduate student
Graduate degree holder
Total
Missing

Frequency(%)
Saudis
Egyptians
34 (19%)
42 (21%)
109 (60%)
123 (62%)
40 (22%)
32 (16%)
183 (100)
197 (100)
17
3

Table 5. 3: Participants' level of education

E.

Monthly income: In the Saudi sample, almost 35% (n=64)

participants earn 15,000 Saudi Riyals or more, followed by those making 10,000
to under 15,000 (n=42, 23%), followed by those earning 5,000 to under 10,000
SR (n=41, 22%), then those who make 1,000 to under 5,000 (n=30, 16%) and last
those making less than 1,000 riyals (n=6, 3%).
In the Egyptian sample, majority of them were making 5,000 to under 10,000
L.E., followed by those making 15,000 or more (n=40, 22%), followed by those
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earning 10,000 to under 15,000 (n=25, 14%) and last those 1% who make less than
1,000 Egyptian pounds.
For comparison purposes, the Saudi Riyals was converted to LE (1 SR ≈ 1.5
LE). Mean incomes for the Saudi and Egyptian sample were 16,921.4, 11,017.9 L.E.
respectively.

Monthly Income in SR
Saudis
Frequency(%)
<1000 SR
6 (3%)
1,000-<5,000 SR
30 (16%)
5,000-<10,000 SR
41 (22%)
10,000-<15,000 SR
42 (23%)
15,000 & above SR
64 (35%)
Total
183 (100)
Missing
7

Table 5. 4: Saudis' monthly income

Mean Income in LE
SD

Monthly Income in LE
Egyptians
Frequency(%)
<1000 LE
1 (1%)
1,000-<5,000 LE
58 (32%)
5,000-<10,000 LE
59 (32%)
10,000-<15,000 LE
25 (14%)
15,000 & above LE
40 (22%)
Total
183 (100)
missing
7

Table 5. 5: Egyptians' monthly income

Average rating
Saudis
16,921.4
3,473.16

Egyptians
11,017.9
2,471.82

Table 5. 6: Participants' average income rating (in L.E.)

F.

Exposure: The majority of respondents have visited other countries

than their own. Only 5% (n=10) of the Saudi sample and 4% (n=7) of the
Egyptian sample have never travelled out of their countries.

Have you ever travelled out
of your country?
Yes
No
Total
Missing

Frequency(%)
Saudis
Egyptians
183 (95%) 189 (96%)
10 (5%)
7 (4%)
193 (100)
196 (100)
7
4

Table 5. 7: Participants' exposure
For the Egyptian sample, only 20% (n=40) have visited Saudi for reasons
other than Hajj or Omra where their visit did not exceed 10 days in the Kingdom.
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Egyptians
Frequency
40
159
199
1

Response
Yes
No
Total
Missing

%
20
80
100

Table 5. 8: Egyptian participants' visit to Saudi
G.

TV: All of the 400 respondents of both countries watch TV for at least

one hour per week.
For the Saudi sample, almost 35% watch TV for at least one to under 4 hours
per week while 33% spend 4 to under 7 hours per week and the remaining 33% spend
7 or more hours watching TV per week.
The Egyptian sample scores are not very different from the Saudi. Almost
27% watch TV for at least one to under 4 hours per week while 33% spend 4 to under
7 hours per week and the remaining 40% spend 7 or more hours watching TV per
week.

50

40

Percent

30

Saudis
Egyptians
35

33

40
33

33

27

20

10

0
1-less than 4

4-less than 7

7 or more

Watching time in hours / week
Q5

Figure 5. 1: Hours spent watching TV
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II. What are the patterns of Television viewership and exposure among
Saudis and Egyptians?
To study the sources selected, watched and trusted by both Egyptians and
Saudis, the study proposed a number of research questions and hypotheses:
RQ 1.a: Which channels are mostly watched by Egyptians?
RQ 1.b: Which channels are mostly watched by Saudis?
RH 1.a: Egyptians tend to seek foreign and their local (Egyptian) sources when
seeking information about Saudi women.
RH 1.b: Saudis tend to seek their local (Saudi) sources when seeking information
about Saudi women.
RQ 1.c: Do Egyptians seek alternative media than their initial chosen source?
RQ 1.d: Do Saudis seek alternative media than their initial chosen source?
RQ 1.e: Is the Egyptian audience an active one?
RQ 1.f: Is the Saudi audience an active one?
To answer and test these questions and hypotheses, three forms of questions
were asked in the questionnaire: Multiple choice questions, Likert scale and open
ended questions.

RQ 1.a: Which channels are mostly watched by Egyptians?
RQ 1.b: Which channels are mostly watched by Saudis?
There were 6 questions in the survey to answer these questions. Respondents
were asked how often they watch Saudi, Egyptian and foreign news and
entertainment. Available answers were: never, rarely, sometimes, frequently and
always where each participants were free to choose the most appropriate answer.
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Table 5.9 shows the amount of time spent by each participant watching Saudi,
Egyptian and foreign news channels. Results show that 53% (n= 105) of Saudis
frequently and always watch Saudi news followed by the 22% (n= 43) who
sometimes follow Saudi news channels and almost 26% (n= 51) never or rarely watch
them. Most Egyptians, on the other hand, never follow Saudi news channels (n= 109,
55%) followed by the 27% (n= 54) who rarely follow them. Only 14% (n= 28) of
Egyptians sometimes follow the Saudi news; while 4% (n= 6) of them frequently and
always watch them.
Watching Egyptian news channels showed different results. Almost 76% (n=
150) of Saudis never or rarely watch them followed by those who sometimes watch
them (n= 34, 17%); while only 7% (n= 13) frequently and always watch them.
Egyptians' responses, on the other hand, were distributed with close percentages over
the available answers. Most Egyptians sometimes followed their local news channels
(n=77, 39%), followed by those who rarely view them (n=57, 29%), followed by 18%
who frequently watch them (n= 36), 9% who always watch (n= 17) and finally the 6%
who never follow them (n= 11).
Egyptian and Saudi participants' frequency of watching foreign news channels
were almost the same. Most of them sometimes watch foreign news channels (n=62,
32% for Saudis, n=70, 36% for Egyptians), followed by those who frequently watch
(n=54, 28% for Saudis, n=53, 27% for Egyptians), then those rarely follow them
(n=30, 15% for Saudis, n=42, 21% for Egyptians), followed by those who always
watch them (n=26, 13% for Saudis, n=23, 12% for Egyptians) and finally those who
never watch them (n=24, 12% for Saudis, n=8, 4% for Egyptians).
The mean scores for Saudi news channel was 3.41 for Saudis and 1.66 for
Egyptians; Egyptian news channels' mean score was 1.82 for Saudis and 2.95 for
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Egyptians; while foreign news channels showed similar mean scores of 3.14 for
Saudis and 3.2 for Egyptians. The t- test shows high significance in the cases of Saudi
and Egyptian news channels indicating a highly significant difference between news
watching habits for both nationalities with t=6.4, p=0.00 in the case of Saudi news
channels; and t=4.82, p=0.001 in the case of Egyptian news channels. The t- test
shows no significance between the two countries in watching foreign news.

Response
Never
Rarely
Sometimes
Frequently
Always
Total
Missing
Mean response
SD
T
P

Channels/ Nationality
Saudi channels
Egyptian channels
Saudis
Egyptians
Saudis
Egyptians
16 (8%)
109 (55%)
94 (48%)
11 (6%)
35 (18%)
54 (27%)
56 (28%)
57 (29%)
43 (22%)
28 (14%)
34 (17%)
77 (39%)
61 (31%)
3 (2%)
10 (5%)
36 (18%)
44 (22%)
3 (2%)
3 (2%)
17 (9%)
199 (100)
197 (100)
197 (100)
198 (100)
1
3
3
2
3.41
1.66
1.82
2.95
0.487
0.247
0.216
0.407
6.40
4.82
0.000
0.001

Foreign channels
Saudis
Egyptians
24 (12%)
8 (4%)
30 (15%)
42 (21%)
62 (32%)
70 (36%)
54 (28%)
53 (27%)
26 (13%)
23 (12%)
196 (100) 196 (100)
4
4
3.14
3.21
0.415
0.444
0.22
0.831

Table 5. 9: Participants watching habits: News
Table 5.10 shows the amount of time spent by each participant watching
Saudi, Egyptian and foreign entertainment channels. Results show that for the Saudi
entertainment channels, most Saudis always watch them (n=49, 25%), followed by
those who frequently do (n=48, 24%), then those who sometimes watch them (n=46,
23%), then the 18% who rarely watch them (n=35) and finally 10% of them who
never watch them (n=19). On the other hand, 61% (n=120) of Egyptians never watch
them, followed by 20% (n=40) who rarely watch them, then the 13% (n=25) who
sometimes follow these channels and finally only 7% (n=13) who frequently or
always follow them.
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As for the Egyptian entertainment channels, most Saudis sometimes watch
them (n=66, 34%), followed by those who frequently do (n=51, 26%), then those who
always follow (n=28, 14%), followed by those who rarely watch them (n=27, 14%)
and finally those who never do (n=22, 11%). On the other hand, almost 66% (n=130)
of Egyptians sometimes and frequently watch these channels followed by those who
always follow them (n=43, 22%) and finally 13% who never or rarely watch them
(n=24).
Foreign entertainment channels showed similar results for both samples. Both
of them frequently and always watch these channels (n=128, 65% of Saudis, n=159,
81% of Egyptians), followed by those who sometimes watch them channels (n=48,
24% of Saudis, n=27, 14% of Egyptians), then whose who rarely or never watch them
channels (n=21, 11% of Saudis, n=11, 6% of Egyptians).
The mean scores for Saudi entertainment channels was 3.37 for Saudis and
1.68 for Egyptians; Egyptian entertainment channels' mean score was 3.19 for Saudis
and 3.64 for Egyptians, while foreign news channels showed a mean scores of 3.78
for Saudis and 4.18 for Egyptians. A t- test shows high significance in the case of
Saudi entertainment channels indicating a highly significant difference between
watching habits for both nationalities (t=6.76, p=0.00). However, the t test shows no
significance between the two countries in watching Egyptian and foreign
entertainment channels (t=1.23, p=0.254 for Egyptian entertainment channels and
t=0.69, p=0.510 for foreign entertainment channels).
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Response
Never
Rarely
Sometimes
Frequently
Always
Total
Missing
Mean response
SD
T
P

Saudi channels
Saudis
Egyptians
19 (10%)
120 (61%)
35 (18%)
40 (20%)
46 (23%)
25 (13%)
48 (24%)
8 (4%)
49 (25%)
5 (3%)
197 (100)
198 (100)
3
2
3.37
1.68
0.461
0.196
6.76
0.000

Channels/ Nationality
Egyptian channels
Saudis
Egyptians
22 (11%)
7 (4%)
27 (14%)
17 (9%)
66 (34%)
59 (30%)
51 (26%)
71 (36%)
28 (14%)
43 (22%)
194 (100)
197 (100)
6
3
3.19
3.64
0.427
0.604
1.23
0.254

Foreign channels
Saudis
Egyptians
8 (4%)
1 (1%)
13 (7%)
10 (5%)
48 (24%)
27 (14%)
74 (38%)
73 (37%)
54 (27%)
86 (44%)
197 (100)
197 (100)
3
3
3.78
4.18
0.678
0.954
0.69
0.510

Table 5. 10: Participants watching habits: Entertainment
Therefore, regarding news channels, Saudis follow Saudi and foreign news
channels and ignore the Egyptian channels while Egyptians follow Egyptian and
foreign news channels and ignore Saudi ones. In terms of entertainment, Saudis
follow Saudi, Egyptian and foreign entertainment channels; while Egyptians ignore
the Saudi entertainment channels and follow the Egyptian and foreign ones.

RH 1.a: Egyptians tend to seek foreign and their local (Egyptian) sources
when seeking information about Saudi women.
RH 1.b: Saudis tend to seek their local (Saudi) sources when seeking
information about Saudi women.
In order to test these hypotheses, five questions were used. First, respondents
were asked about how much time they spent watching Saudi, Egyptian and Foreign
news; second they were asked about a famous incident in Saudi and the sources they
were seeking to find more about this incident.
As the above table 5.9 shows, the majority of Egyptians watch either foreign
or Egyptian news channels and never watch the Saudi ones; while Saudis, on the other
hand watch their own Saudi news and never watch Egyptian news channels.
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When both samples were asked about the Qatif girl incident in Saudi Arabia, a
significant difference between the sources they were seeking appeared. As figure 5.2
shows, majority of Saudis have heard of the incident and were seeking information
through Saudi channels while most Egyptians turned to foreign channels.
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Figure 5. 2: Qatif girl incident
As table 5.11 shows 60% (n=78) of Saudis turned to Saudi channels while
most Egyptians (n=23, 58%) of them turned to the foreign channels. Calculating the
Chi square (χ2) shows high significance indicating a high significant difference
between Saudis and Egyptians (χ2=86.7, p=0.00). Therefore, both hypotheses are
accepted. Egyptians mostly seek foreign channels while most Saudis turned to their
local news channels.
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Channels
Saudi channels
Egyptian channels
Foreign channels
Saudi & Foreign
Egyptian & Foreign
Saudi, Egyptian & Foreign
Total
Missing
chi square
P

Saudis
78 (60%)
4 (3%)
22 (17%)
23 (18%)
0
2 (2%)
129 (100)
71
86.7
0.000

Egyptians
0
8 (20%)
23 (58%)
1 (3%)
8 (20%)
0
40 (100)
160

Table 5. 11: Qatif girl's sources

RQ 1.c: Do Egyptians seek alternative media than their initial chosen
source?
RQ 1.d: Do Saudis seek alternative media than their initial chosen
source?
There were five questions targeted at answering these questions. First,
respondents were asked to state their level of agreement with the following
statements:


I trust my favorite TV channel's coverage of issues



TV is a source of entertainment for me.



TV is a source of information for me.



I only obtain information from my favorite TV channel
Second, they were also asked to choose between the channels they were

seeking for information about "Qatif girl".
Table 5.12 shows the mean scores of each statement. Saudis and Egyptians'
scores for the statement "I trust my favorite TV channel's coverage of issues" is close,
but Saudis are agreeing more with it (mean score= 3.54 for the Saudi sample, and
3.09 for the Egyptian sample). Both samples showed a stronger agreement with "TV
is a source of entertainment for me" (mean score= 4.02 for the Saudi sample and 4.08
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for the Egyptian sample). Also, they both agree that "TV is a source of information
for me (mean score= 3.74 for the Saudi sample and 3.73 for the Egyptian sample).
Saudis also agree with the statement "I only obtain information from my favorite TV
channel", while Egyptians tend to disagree (mean score= 3.04 for the Saudi sample
and 2.42 for the Egyptian sample).
A t-test shows no significance for the first three statements indicating no
difference between both the Saudi and Egyptian sample, while the statement "I only
obtain information from my favorite TV channel" showed significance indicating a
significant difference between both samples (t=2.79, p=0.024).

Statement
47. I trust my favorite TV channel's
coverage of issues
56. TV is a source of entertainment for
me.
57. TV is a source of information for me.
58. I only obtain information from my
favorite TV channel

Saudis
Mean
Scores
SD

Egyptians
Mean
Scores
SD

t

P

3.54

0.57

3.09

0.533

1.17

0.276

4.02
3.74

0.948
0.787

4.08
3.73

0.998
0.877

0.08
0.01

0.938
0.992

3.04

0.396

2.42

0.222

2.79

0.024

Table 5. 12: Alternative sources
Second, as proved in the above sections, most Saudis turned to their local
news (n= 78, 60%), only 17% (n=22) turned to foreign channels while 3% (n=4) of
them turned to Egyptian channels. A small percentage of them turned to alternative
channels. For example, only 18% (n= 23) of Saudis turned to foreign news along with
their Saudi channels while none of them turned to Egyptian and foreign news together
and only 2% (n= 2) watched all news channels (Saudi, foreign and Egyptian).
Egyptians on the other hand, mostly turned to foreign channels (n= 23, 58%)
while only 20% (n=8) turned to Egyptian channels and none to the Saudi news. A
small percentage of them turned to alternative channels. For example, only 20% (n=8)
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of Egyptians turned to foreign news along with their Egyptian channels while none of
them turned watched all news channels (Saudi, foreign and Egyptian) and only 3% (
n=1) turned to Saudi and foreign channels together.
Accordingly, TV is a source of information and entertainment for both
samples and they both trust their favorite channel's coverage. Egyptians tend to seek
alternative sources more than Saudis do. However, both of them remain loyal to their
initial sources.

RQ 1.e: Is the Egyptian audience an active one?
RQ 1.f: Is the Saudi audience an active one?
There were four questions targeted at answering these questions. Respondents
were asked to state their level of agreement with the following statements:


My idea of Saudi women is based on what I saw and heard on TV or any other
media.



I only obtain information from my favorite TV channel.



I usually flip between my favorite news channel and other channels.



TV has an effect on my perception of issues.
Table 5.13 shows the mean scores for both samples. Saudis mean score for

"My idea of Saudi women is based on what I saw and heard on TV or any other
media" was 1.92; while Egyptians' mean was 2.92. The statement "I only obtain
information from my favorite TV channel" showed a mean of 3.04 for Saudis and
2.42 for Egyptians. Saudis mean score for "I usually flip between my favorite news
channel and other channels" was 3.2; while Egyptians' mean was 3.46. The statement
"TV has an effect on my perception of issues" showed a mean of 3.72 for Saudis and
3.68 for Egyptians.
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A t-test showed that high significance for the first statement indicating a
highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians (t=4.04, p=0.004) and
significance for the second statement indicating a significant difference between both
samples (t=2.79, p=0.024). However, the test showed no significance for the third and
fourth statements indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians
for both statements.
Accordingly, the participants' idea of Saudi women was more TV based for
Egyptians than Saudis. However, Saudis tend to only obtain information from their
favorite channels and not switch or flip between channels more than Egyptians do.
For both samples, TV has an effect on their perception of issues.

Statements
55. My idea of Saudi women is based on what
I saw and heard on TV or any other media.
58. I only obtain information from my favorite
TV channel
60. I usually flip between my favorite news
channel and other channels.
62. TV has an effect on my perception of
issues.

Saudis
Mean
score
SD

Egyptians
Mean
score
SD

t

p

1.92

0.211

2.92

0.444

4.04

0.004

3.04

0.396

2.42

0.222

2.79

0.024

3.2

0.629

3.46

0.774

0.52

0.617

3.72

0.668

3.68

0.746

0.08

0.938

Table 5. 13: Audience's activeness

III. What are the patterns of perception of Saudi and foreign media among
Saudis and Egyptians?
The study proposed a number of research questions and hypotheses to learn
more about both media:
RH 2.a: Egyptians have low knowledge of Saudi movies.
RH 2.b: Saudis have high knowledge of Saudi movies.
RQ 2.a: How do Egyptians perceive Saudi media vs. other media?
RQ 2.b: How do Saudis perceive Saudi media vs. other media?
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To answer and test these questions and hypotheses, three forms of questions
were asked in the questionnaire: Multiple choice questions, Likert scale and open
ended questions.

RH 2.a: Egyptians have low knowledge of Saudi movies.
RH 2.b: Saudis have high knowledge of Saudi movies.
There were three questions in the survey that targeted these hypotheses.
Respondents were asked if they have heard of any Saudi movie, its name and whether
they have watched it or not.
According to table 5.14, majority of Saudis (n=163, 84%) have heard of a
Saudi movie while most Egyptians did not (n=109, 56%). Calculating the Chi square
shows a high significance at χ2=69.4 and p= 0.000 indicating a highly significant
difference between distributions of both samples which supports both hypotheses.
Response
Yes
No
Total
Missing
chi square
P

Frequency(%)
Saudis
Egyptians
163 (84%)
85 (44%)
30 (16%)
109 (56%)
193 (100)
194 (100)
7
6
69.4
0.000

Table 5. 14: Having heard of any Saudi movie
Table 5.15 shows that 77% (n=126) of Saudis have watched the movies they
stated while only 31% (n=27) of Egyptians watched them. Therefore, even though
44% (n=85) of Egyptians have heard of a Saudi movie, almost 69% (n=60) of them
have not watched it.
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Response
Yes
No
Total
Missing

Frequency(%)
Saudis
Egyptians
126 (77%)
27 (31%)
37 (23%)
60 (69%)
163 (100)
87 (100)
37
113

Table 5. 15: Having watched any Saudi movie

RQ 2.a: How do Egyptians perceive Saudi media vs. other media?
RQ 2.b: How do Saudis perceive Saudi media vs. other media?
There were 11 questions in the survey to answer these questions. The first five
questions asked the respondents to state which media they found most trustworthy,
credible, accessible, of highest quality and variety of programs.
Tables 5.16 to 5.20 show the following:
a) Trustworthiness:
In terms of trust, Saudis believe that the Saudi media are the most trusted
(n=101, 52%) followed by foreign media (n=88, 46%) and Egyptian (n=4, 2%).
Egyptians on the other hand, believe that foreign media are the most trusted (n=152,
79%) followed by Egyptian media (n=37, 19%) and Saudi (n=4, 2%).
b) Credibility:
In terms of Credibility, Saudis believe that the media most credible are the
foreign (n=104, 54%) followed by Saudi media (n=88, 45%) and Egyptian (n=2, 1%).
Egyptians also believe that foreign media are the most credible too (n=167, 86%)
followed by Egyptian media (n=22, 11%) and Saudi (n=5, 3%).
c) Accessibility:
In terms of accessibility, Saudis believe that the Saudi media are the most
accessible to them (n=115, 60%) followed by foreign media (n= 61, 32%) and
Egyptian (n= 16, 8%). Egyptians on the other hand, believe that Egyptian media are
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the most accessible (n= 128, 66%) followed by foreign media (n=61, 32%) and Saudi
(n= 4, 2%).
d) Quality:
When it comes to the quality, both Saudis and Egyptians believe that the
foreign media have the highest quality (n=133, 68%, n=183, 93%, respectively).
Saudis believe that Saudi media come in second place (n=58, 30%) followed by
Egyptian (n=4, 2%) while Egyptians believe that Egyptian media come in second
place (n=10, 5%) followed by Saudi (n=4, 2%).
e) Variety:
Regarding the media with the most variety of programs, Saudis and Egyptians
had the same order with different percentages. They believe that the foreign media
have the most variety (Saudi n=119, 60%, Egyptian n=148, 75%). Saudis and
Egyptians ranked Egyptian media as the second (both with 21%,); followed by the
Saudi media (n=37, 19% and n=8, 4%, respectively).

Channels
Saudi channels
Egyptian channels
Foreign channels
Total
Missing

Frequency(%)
Saudis
Egyptians
101 (52%)
4 (2%)
4 (2%)
37 (19%)
88 (46%)
152 (79%)
193 (100)
193 (100)
7

7

Table 5. 16: Most trusted media

Channels
Saudi channels
Egyptian channels
Foreign channels
Total
Missing

Frequency(%)
Saudis
Egyptians
88 (45%)
5 (3%)
2 (1%)
22 (11%)
104 (54%)
167 (86%)
194 (100)
194 (100)
6
6

Table 5. 17: Most credible media
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Channels
Saudi channels
Egyptian channels
Foreign channels
Total
Missing

Frequency(%)
Saudis
Egyptians
115 (60%)
4 (2%)
16 (8%)
128 (66%)
61 (32%)
61 (32%)
192 (100)
193 (100)
8
7

Table 5. 18: Most accessible media

Channels
Saudi channels
Egyptian channels
Foreign channels
Total
Missing

Frequency(%)
Saudis
Egyptians
58 (30%)
4 (2%)
4 (2%)
10 (5%)
133 (68%)
183 (93%)
195 (100)
197 (100)
5
3

Table 5. 19: Media with the highest quality

Channels
Saudi channels
Egyptian channels
Foreign channels
Total
Missing

Frequency(%)
Saudis
Egyptians
37 (19%)
8 (4%)
41 (21%)
41 (21%)
119 (60%)
148 (75%)
197 (100)
197 (100)
3
3

Table 5. 20: Media with most variety of programs
Second, respondents were asked to determine their level of agreement with
these following 6 statements:


Western media portray a negative image of Saudi women.



Western media portray an accurate image of Saudi women



Saudi media portray a positive image of Saudi women.



Saudi media portray an accurate image of Saudi women.



Egyptian media portray a negative image of Saudi women.



Egyptian media portray an accurate image of Saudi women.

Table 5.21 shows the mean scores of each statement. Saudis agree with
"Western media portray a negative image of Saudi women" more strongly than
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Egyptians. Both Saudis and Egyptians disagree with the fact that western media
portray an accurate image; however, the mean score shows that Saudis are in more
disagreement than Egyptians. Also, Saudis agree more than Egyptians with Saudi
media portraying a positive image of their women. Whether Saudi media portray an
accurate image of Saudi women or not is neutral to both samples with the Saudi
participants closer to agreeing than Egyptians. Both samples are neutral about
Egyptian media portraying a negative image of Saudi women; however, Saudis are
closer to agreeing while Egyptians are closer to disagreeing with the statement. Saudis
and Egyptians also were neutral about Egyptian media portraying an accurate image
of Saudi women.
A t-test shows no significance for all statements indicating no significant
difference between Saudis and Egyptians. The only statement that showed
significance is "Western media portray an accurate image of Saudi women"
indicating a difference between Saudis and Egyptians (t=2.54, p=0.035).

Statements
49. Western media portray a negative
image of Saudi women.
50. Western media portray an accurate
image of Saudi women.
51. Saudi media portray a positive image
of Saudi women.
52. Saudi media portray an accurate
image of Saudi women.
53. Egyptian media portray a negative
image of Saudi women.
54. Egyptian media portray an accurate
image of Saudi women.

Saudis
Mean
score
SD

Egyptians
Mean
score
SD

t

P

4.26

1.024

3.83

0.748

0.68 0.516

1.89

0.304

2.46

0.331

2.54 0.035

3.45

0.583

2.96

0.507

1.26 0.243

3.14

0.481

2.56

0.523

1.63 0.142

3.24

0.561

2.91

0.523

0.87 0.410

2.47

0.602

2.78

0.68

0.66 0.528

Table 5. 21: Comparing media
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IV. What are the patterns of perceptions of Saudi women among Saudis and
Egyptians?
To analyze the perception of Saudi women by both Egyptians and Saudis, the
study proposed a number of research questions and hypotheses:
RH 3.a: Egyptians tend to have a negative perception of Saudi women.
RH 3.b: Saudis tend to have a positive perception of Saudi women.
RQ 3.a: What is the relationship between the amount of TV watched and the Saudi
perception of Saudi women?
RQ 3.b: What is the relationship between the amount of TV watched and the Egyptian
perception of Saudi women?
To answer these questions and test the hypotheses, four forms of questions
were asked in the questionnaire: Multiple choice, ranking, Likert scale and true or
false questions.

RH 3.a: Egyptians tend to have a negative perception of Saudi women.
RH 3.b: Saudis tend to have a positive perception of Saudi women.
For these hypotheses, three forms of questions were asked in the
questionnaire: one rank question, 23 true or false statements and nine Likert scale
ones.
The first question asked participants to rank the available answers (the king,
Islam and Quran, Islamic clerics and Sheikhs, Saudi tradition and customs and interior
ministry) according to their power in setting rules in Saudi for women. There exists
no correct order for these factors. For example, sometimes Islamic clerics set rules
when other times the king interferes. Each participant from both countries rank the
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options according to his/her own perception of distribution of power in Saudi Arabia.
A comparison between responses of both countries was made.
Table 5.22 shows that mean scores of each factor for both samples. As for
the Saudis, the mean score for power of "Islam and Quran" is the highest of 3.61,
followed by "Islamic clerics and sheikhs" with a mean of 3.27, then the "king" with a
mean of 3.09, "Saudi tradition and customs" with a mean of 3.05 and last the "interior
ministry" with a mean of 2.7.
Egyptians had different a perception of the distribution of power where they
ranked the "Saudi tradition and custom" as number one with a mean of 3.47, followed
by the "Islamic clerics" with a mean of 3.37, then "Islam and Quran" in the third place
with a mean of 3.05, king with a mean of 3.01 and finally the "interior ministry" with
a mean of 2.81.
A t- test for each factor shows:
1)

King: no significance indicating no significant difference between Saudis and

Egyptians (p=0.765 and t=0.31).
2)

Islam and Quran: no significance indicating no significant difference between

Saudis and Egyptians (p=0.261 and t=1.21).
3)

Islamic clerics and Sheikhs: no significance indicating no significant

difference between Saudis and Egyptians (p=0.772 and t=0.3).
4)

Saudi tradition and customs: no significance indicating no significant

difference between Saudis and Egyptians (p=0.214 and t=1.35).
5)

Interior Ministry: no significance indicating no significant difference between

Saudis and Egyptians (p=0.578 and t=0.58).
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Saudis
Factors of
power

Mean
Scores

SD

King

3.09

Islam & Quran

Egyptians
T

P

4

0.31

0.765

0.463

3

1.21

0.261

3.37

0.465

2

0.3

0.772

4

3.47

0.52

1

1.35

0.214

Interior ministry
2.7
0.207
5
Table 5. 22: Distribution of power

2.81

0.335

5

0.58

0.578

Order

Mean
Scores

SD

Order

0.462

3

3.01

0.294

3.61

0.79

1

3.05

Islamic clerics &
Sheikhs

3.27

0.448

2

Saudi traditions
& customs

3.05

0.353

Second, 23 true or false statements are asked to test the knowledge and
perceptions of both samples of the status of Saudi women, and to compare the results
of the two samples. The statements are not all correct; some are incorrect. Other
statements are not facts, but rather included to analyze the opinions of both samples.
The statements below are correct:


Saudi women can own a car in their name in the kingdom



Saudi women can travel abroad without a male companion



Saudi women can have a passport or an identification card



Saudi has gender mixed universities



More than half of Saudi's school graduates are female



Saudi women can work as journalists



Saudi women can work as senior executives



Saudi women can work as doctors



Saudi women can share offices with men



Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi chamber of commerce
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Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to drive

These statements are incorrect:


Saudi women can drive in the kingdom



Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe



Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi parliament



Saudi women are allowed to work as judges



Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to vote



Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to work

in public

Table 5.23 shows the Chi square test results for all statements. The table
shows that there is a general high significance in the majority of the statements
indicating a highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians with p<0.01.
Only the statement "Saudi women are allowed to work as judges" shows significant
difference with p<0.05. However, the test indicates no significant difference between
both groups in these statements:


Saudi women can have a passport or an identification card



Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi parliament



Saudi women are allowed to work as judges

Those who said
"True" in percentages
Saudis

Egyptians

Chi
Square
χ2

18. Saudi women can own a car in their name in the kingdom

90

47

79.7

0.000

19. Saudi women can have a passport or an identification card

89

90

0.1

0.741

Statement

p

Correct Statements
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20. Saudi women can travel abroad without a male companion

64

30

44.5

0.000

21. Saudi has gender mixed universities

63

30

42.1

0.000

22. More than half of Saudi's school graduates are female

86

36

97.8

0.000

23. Saudi women can work as journalists

96

57

97.7

0.000

24. Saudi women can work as senior executives

84

41

75.2

0.000

25. Saudi women can work as doctors

99

75

52.3

0.000

26. Saudi women can share offices with men

79

17

147.4

0.000

27. Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi chamber of
commerce

86

43

77.3

0.000

28. Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to drive

74

62

5.9

0.017

29. Saudi women can drive in the kingdom

5

16

13.8

0.000

30. Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe
in public
31. Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi parliament

11

61

106.1

0.000

16

17

0.03

0.892

32. Saudi women are allowed to work as judges

4

5

0.22

0.810

33. Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to vote

86

44

72.8

0.000

34. Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to work

28

67

58.0

0.000

35. Saudi women are happy with their status in the society

65

16

97.8

0.000

36. Saudi women can choose their future husbands

87

56

46.9

0.000

37. Saudi's schools' curricula are completely based on Islam

76

52

23.6

0.000

38. Saudi women live as second class citizens

24

59

51.2

0.000

39. Saudi women live a struggled life

17

70

112.2

0.000

40. Saudi women are eager to seek higher education as their
peer men

94

81

15.8

0.000

Incorrect Statements

Opinion Statements

Table 5. 23: True or False
Some particular Saudi participants' responses to these statements are worth
mentioning. They did not just state if the above statements are true or false, but they
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also commented on some of them. For example, a Saudi male participant stated that
"Saudi has gender mixed universities" is unfortunately true. Another Saudi male said
that "Saudi women can share offices with men" is a true statement though he objects.
Another Saudi woman mentioned that "Saudi women live as second class citizens" is
false although women are negatively affected by the strict unfair guardianship and
divorce laws.
Third, nine Likert scale statements were asked to indicate opinions of the
respondents of Saudi and its women. A comparison between responses of both
nationalities can be made.
A t- test showed:


Significance for "Saudi Arabia is the closet country to a pure Islamic society"
indicating a significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis agree
with this statement more than Egyptians (t=3.23, p=0.012). The statement
showed a mean score of 3.91 and standard deviation of 0.82 for the Saudi
population and a mean score of 2.54 and standard deviation of 0.227 for the
Egyptian population.



High significance for "Islam calls for sex segregation" indicating a highly
significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis also agree with
this statement much more than Egyptians (t=3.97, p=0.004). The statement
showed a mean score of 3.24 and standard deviation of 0.425 for the Saudi
population and a mean score of 2.3 and standard deviation of 0.211 for the
Egyptian population.



High significance for "Islam calls for face veil (niqab)" indicating a highly
significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis also agree with
this statement while Egyptians disagree or strongly disagree (t=6.66, p=0.000).
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The statement showed a mean score of 3.02 and standard deviation of 0.331
for the Saudi population and a mean score of 1.65 and standard deviation of
0.243 for the Egyptian population.


High significance for "True Islam is implemented in Saudi Arabia" indicating
a highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis agree
with this statement while Egyptians disagree (t=4.09, p=0.004). The statement
showed a mean score of 3.36 and standard deviation of 0.571 for the Saudi
population and a mean score of 2 and standard deviation of 0.339 for the
Egyptian population.



High significance for "Saudi women are satisfied with their lives" indicating a
highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis agree with
this statement while Egyptians disagree (t=4.06, p=0.004). The statement
showed a mean score of 3.45 and standard deviation of 0.605 for the Saudi
population and a mean score of 2.14 and standard deviation of 0.335 for the
Egyptian population.



High significance for "Saudi women are the ideal Islamic women" indicating a
highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis agree with
this statement while Egyptians disagree or strongly disagree (t=5.56, p=0.001).
The statement showed a mean score of 3.34 and standard deviation of 0.443
for the Saudi population and a mean score of 1.79 and standard deviation of
0.333 for the Egyptian population.



No significance for "Saudi's government is responsible for Saudi women's
current condition and status" indicating no significant difference between
Saudis and Egyptians (t=0.15, p=0.885). Both agreed with the statement. The
statement showed a mean score of 3.63 and standard deviation of 0.608 for the
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Saudi population and a mean score of 3.71 and standard deviation of 0.761 for
the Egyptian population.


High significance for "Saudi men prefer their women to be second class
citizens" indicating a highly significant difference between Saudis and
Egyptians. Saudis disagreed with the statement while Egyptians agreed
(t=3.45, p=0.009). The statement showed a mean score of 2.39 and standard
deviation of 0.199 for the Saudi population and a mean score of 3.53 and
standard deviation of 0.627 for the Egyptian population.



No significance for "Non Saudis have a wrong perception of Saudi women"
indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians (t=1.32,
p=0.223). Both agreed with the statement. The statement showed a mean score
of 4.23 and standard deviation of 1.018 for the Saudi population and a mean
score of 3.45 and standard deviation of 0.59 for the Egyptian population.

Statement
41. Saudi Arabia is the closet country to a
pure Islamic society.
42. Islam calls for sex segregation.
43. Islam calls for face veil (niqab).
44. True Islam is implemented in Saudi
Arabia.
45. Saudi women are satisfied with their
lives.
46. Saudi women are the ideal Islamic
women.
48. Saudi's government is responsible for
Saudi women's current condition and
status.
59. Saudi men prefer their women to be
second class citizens.
61. Non Saudis have a wrong perception
of Saudi women.

Saudis
Mean
Scores
SD

Egyptians
Mean
Scores
SD

t

P

3.91
3.24
3.02

0.82
0.425
0.331

2.54
2.3
1.65

0.227
0.211
0.243

3.23
3.97
6.66

0.012
0.004
0.000

3.36

0.571

2

0.339

4.09

0.004

3.54

0.605

2.14

0.335

4.06

0.004

3.34

0.443

1.79

0.333

5.56

0.001

3.63

0.608

3.71

0.761

0.15

0.885

2.39

0.199

3.53

0.627

3.45

0.009

4.23

1.018

3.45

0.59

1.32

0.223

Table 5.24: Participants perception
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According to all the above, the way Saudis and Egyptians perceive Saudi
women shows many differences. Each sample has a different perspective. Saudis have
a positive perception of their women while Egyptians have a negative perception of
them; hence, RH a.1 and RH a.2 are supported.

RQ 3.a: What is the relationship between the amount of TV watched and
the Saudi perception of Saudi women?
RQ 3.b: What is the relationship between the amount of TV watched and
the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?
To answer these questions, participants were asked about the number of hours
they spend watching television. Moreover, participants were asked to indicate if they
think these statements were true or false:


Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toein public



Saudi women live as second class citizens



Saudi women live a struggled life
Every true answer is an indication of the negative perception while false

answers are an indication of a positive perception.
Table 5.25 shows the relation between the hours spent watching television and
the negative perception created by Saudi participants. The table sums the results of
those who thought the above statements were true as well as the hours they spent
watching TV. The table shows that the number of Saudis with a general negative
perception is minimal. The 43% of Saudis (n=9) who thought that "every woman in
Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public" is a true statement, were those who
watched TV for less than 4 hours per week. Almost 51% of Saudis (n=23) who
believed that "Saudi women live as second class citizens", were not heavy TV viewers
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as well and watched TV for one to less than four hours per week. Similarly, most
Saudis (58%, n=19) believing that "Saudi women live a struggled life" were those
who watched TV for one hour up to less than 4 hours.

Statement
Q24 Every woman in
Saudi must be covered
from head to toe in public
Q38 Saudi women live as
second class citizens
Q39 Saudi women live a
struggled life

Nationality

1-<4

Frequency(%)
4-<7
7 or more

Total

9(43%)

5(24%)

7(33%)

21(100)

23(51%)

12(27%)

10(22%)

45(100)

7(21%)

33(100)

Saudis
Saudis

19(58%) 7(21%)
Saudis
Table 5. 25: Hours watched vs. Saudi perception

Table 5.26 shows the relation between the hours spent watching television and
the negative perception created by Egyptian participants. The table sums the results of
those who thought the above statements were true as well as the hours they spent
watching TV. The table shows that most Egyptians have a negative perception of
Saudi women. Most Egyptians (45%, n=53) who thought that the statement is true
were heavy TV viewers (those who watched for seven hours or more per week). Also,
Egyptians (43%, n=50) who believed the second statement is true, watched TV for 7
hours or more. For the third statement, Egyptians (39%, n=54) who agreed were also
heavy TV viewers.

Statement
Q24 Every woman in
Saudi must be covered
from head to toe in public

Nationality

1-<4

Frequency(%)
4-<7
7 or more

Total

30(25%)

35(30%)

53(45%)

118(100)

26(22%)

40(34%)

50(43%)

116(100)

Egyptians
37(27%) 46(34%)
Table 5. 26: Hours watched vs. Egyptian perception

54(39%)

137(100)

Q38 Saudi women live as
second class citizens
Q39 Saudi women live a
struggled life

Egyptians
Egyptians
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Calculating the Chi square (χ2) for each statement showed significance at χ2=
6.81 and p= 0.033 indicating a significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians
for the first statement. Also, believing that "Saudi women live as second class
citizens" showed high significance at χ2= 18.87 and p= 0.000 indicating a highly
significant difference between both samples. The last statement also showed high
significance levels at χ2= 19.3 and p= 0.000 indicating a high significant difference
between Saudis and Egyptians.

Statement
Q24 Every woman in
Saudi must be covered
from head to toe in public
Q38 Saudi women live as
second class citizens

chi

P

6.81 .033
18.87 0.000

Q39 Saudi women live a
struggled life

19.3 0.000
Table 5. 27: Chi Square test

According to the above, the amount of TV watched has an effect on the
Egyptian participants. The more they watch, the more negative their perception is.
However, amount of time spent watching TV did not affect the Saudi sample similarly
since only a minority of them had a negative perception and all of those with negative
perception were light viewers of TV.

V. What are the patterns of Television exposure and perceptions of Saudi
women among Saudis and Egyptians?
To study the effect of the amount of TV watched by both Egyptians and
Saudis on the perception of Saudi women, the study proposed a number of research
questions and hypotheses:
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RQ 4.a: How do foreign media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?
RQ 4.b: How do foreign media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?
RQ 4.c: How do Saudi media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?
RQ 4.d: How do Saudi media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?
RQ 4.e: How do Egyptian media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?
RQ 4.f: How do Egyptian media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?
To answer the above questions, participants were asked to indicate the
frequency of time they spent watching each media (foreign, Saudi and Egyptian) as
well as their opinion on the below statements to indicate their perception:


Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe



Saudi women live as second class citizens



Saudi women live a struggled life

in public

Every true answer is an indication of a negative perception while false answers
are an indication of a positive perception.
While reading this section, one has to bear in mind a number of factors that
will affect results:
1. Very few Saudis had a negative perception of Saudi women while
most Egyptians had a negative perception.
2.

Most Egyptians did not follow Saudi news or entertainment channels.

3. Most Saudis did not watch Egyptian news channels.

RQ 4.a: How do foreign media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi
women?
RQ 4.b: How do foreign media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi
women?
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The statements mentioned above will be linked with watching foreign media.
There are two questions in the questionnaire that target those foreign media followers.
They were asked about the frequency of watching foreign 1) news and 2)
entertainment.
Table 5.28 shows the relation between the frequency of watching foreign news
and the negative or positive perception created. Assuming values as Never=1,
Rarely=2, Sometimes=3, Frequently=4, Always=5, the table gives the mean scores for
both samples. The results of Saudis and Egyptians are very similar for all the
statements. Most Saudis who had a negative perception (those agreed with the three
statements) were sometimes following foreign news channels. Similarly Egyptians
with negative perception were also sometimes following foreign news channels.
Total mean scores for the Saudi sample is 2.95 and total mean scores for the Egyptian
sample is 3.28.
A t-test for all the statements shows no significance indicating no significant
difference between Saudis and Egyptians.
Statement
Q24. Every woman in Saudi must be
covered from head to toe in public
Q38. Saudi women live as second class
citizens
Q39. Saudi women live a struggled life
TOTAL

Saudis
Mean
Scores
SD

Egyptians
Mean
Scores
SD

t

P

3.05

0.347

3.30

0.444

1.01

0.370

2.95
3.23
2.95

0.518
0.543
0.451

3.31
2.83
3.28

0.440
0.409
0.429

1.18
1.16
1.18

0.303
0.311
0.303

Table 5. 28: Perceptions by viewers of foreign news channels
Table 5.29 shows the relation between the frequency of watching foreign
entertainment and the negative or positive perception created. Most Saudis who had
a negative perception (those agreed with the three statements) were sometimes
following foreign entertainment channels; while Egyptians with negative perception
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were frequently following foreign entertainment channels. Total mean scores for the
Saudi sample is 3.72 and total mean scores for the Egyptian sample is 4.13.
A t-test for all the statements also shows no significance indicating no
significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians.

Statement
Q24. Every woman in Saudi must be
covered from head to toe in public
Q38. Saudi women live as second class
citizens
Q39. Saudi women live a struggled life
TOTAL

Saudis
Mean
Scores
SD

Egyptians
Mean
Scores
SD

t

P

3.86

0.695

4.17

0.959

0.59

0.587

3.73
3.61
3.72

0.710
0.585
0.661

4.15
4.09
4.13

0.932
0.882
0.921

0.80
1.02
0.82

0.468
0.365
0.458

Table 5. 29: Perceptions by viewers of foreign entertainment channels
Accordingly, a minority of Saudis who have negative perceptions of Saudi
women sometimes watch foreign news and entertainment channels. However, most
Egyptians with the negative perception are those who sometimes watch foreign news
channels and frequently watch foreign entertainment.

RQ 4.c: How do Saudi media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi
women?
RQ 4.d: How do Saudi media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi
women?
The statements mentioned above will be linked with watching Saudi media.
There are two questions in the questionnaire that target those Saudi media followers.
They were asked about the frequency of watching Saudi 1) news and 2)
entertainment.
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Table 5.30 shows the relation between the frequency of watching Saudi news
and the negative or positive perception created. Assuming values as Never=1,
Rarely=2, Sometimes=3, Frequently=4, Always=5, the table gives the mean scores for
both samples. Majority of Saudis who agreed that "every woman in Saudi must be
covered from head to toe" were sometimes following Saudi news channels. However,
Saudis who believed that "Saudi women live as second class citizens" and "Saudi
women live a struggled life" were rarely following Saudi news channels. On the other
hand, most Egyptians with negative perception (those who agreed with all the
statements) rarely or never watched Saudi news channels. Total mean scores for the
Saudi sample is 2.78 and total mean scores for the Egyptian sample is 1.62.
A t-test shows high significance for the first and second statements, indicating
a highly significant difference between Saudis' and Egyptians' mean scores. The third
statement also showed significance indicating a significant difference between both
samples.
Statement
Q24. Every woman in Saudi must be
covered from head to toe in public
Q38. Saudi women live as second class
citizens
Q39. Saudi women live a struggled life
TOTAL

Saudis
Mean
Scores
SD

Egyptians
Mean
Scores
SD

t

P

3.52

0.494

1.58

0.274

7.69

0.001

2.67
2.45
2.78

0.353
0.417
0.328

1.68
1.60
1.62

0.262
0.259
0.263

5.05
3.89
6.17

0.007
0.018
0.003

Table 5. 30: Perceptions by viewers of Saudi news channels
Table 5.31 shows the relation between the frequency of watching Saudi
entertainment and the negative or positive perception created. Most Saudis who
agreed that "every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe" were
sometimes following Saudi entertainment channels. However, Saudis who believed
that "Saudi women live as second class citizens" and "Saudi women live a struggled
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life" were rarely following Saudi entertainment channels. On the other hand, most
Egyptians with negative perception (those who agreed with all the statements) rarely
or never watched Saudi entertainment channels. Total mean scores for the Saudi
sample is 2.76 and total mean scores for the Egyptian sample is 1.61.
A t-test for all the statements also shows high significance indicating high
significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians mean scores.

Statement

Saudis
Mean
Scores
SD

Q24. Every woman in Saudi must be
covered from head to toe in public
Q38. Saudi women live as second class
citizens
Q39. Saudi women live a struggled life
TOTAL

Egyptians
Mean
Scores
SD

t

P

3.43

0.545

1.62

0.205

6.96

0.002

2.53
2.64
2.76

0.316
0.415
0.322

1.59
1.61
1.61

0.212
0.213
0.210

5.54
4.92
6.70

0.005
0.008
0.003

Table 5. 31: Perceptions by viewers of Saudi entertainment channels
Accordingly, a minority of Saudis who have negative perceptions of Saudi
women sometimes or rarely watch Saudi news and entertainment channels. However,
most Egyptians with the negative perception are those who rarely or never watch
Saudi news channels and entertainment.

RQ 4.e: How do Egyptian media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi
women?
RQ 4.f: How do Egyptian media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi
women?
The statements mentioned above will be linked with watching Egyptian
media. There are two questions in the questionnaire that target those Egyptian media
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followers. They were asked about the frequency of watching Egyptian 1) news and 2)
entertainment.
Table 5.32 shows the relation between the frequency of watching Egyptian
news and the negative or positive perception created. Most Saudis who agreed with
all the statements (hence had a negative perception) were rarely following Egyptians
news channels. On the other hand, most Egyptians with negative perception (those
who agreed with all the statements) sometimes watched Egyptian news channels.
Total mean scores for the Saudi sample is 1.89 and total mean scores for the Egyptian
sample is 2.98.
A t-test for the first and second statements showed high significance indicating
highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians mean scores. The third
statement also showed significance indicating a significant difference between both
samples.

Statement
Q24. Every woman in Saudi must be
covered from head to toe in public
Q38. Saudi women live as second class
citizens
Q39. Saudi women live a struggled life
TOTAL

Saudis
Mean
Scores
SD

Egyptians
Mean
Scores
SD

t

P

1.95

0.270

2.95

0.375

4.82

0.008

1.84
1.91
1.89

0.251
0.386
0.255

2.97
3.01
2.98

0.395
0.442
0.404

5.40
4.46
5.10

0.006
0.011
0.007

Table 5. 32: Perceptions by viewers of Egyptian news channels
Table 5.33 shows the relation between the frequency of watching Egyptian
entertainment and the negative or positive perception created. The results of Saudis
and Egyptians are very similar for all the statements. Most Saudis who had a negative
perception (those agreed with the three statements) were sometimes following
Egyptian entertainment channels. Similarly Egyptians with negative perception were
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also sometimes following Egyptian entertainment channels. Total mean scores for the
Saudi sample is 2.89 and total mean scores for the Egyptian sample is 3.67.
A t-test for all the statements shows no significance indicating no significant
difference between Saudis and Egyptians.

Statement
Q24. Every woman in Saudi must be
covered from head to toe in public
Q38. Saudi women live as second class
citizens
Q39. Saudi women live a struggled life
TOTAL

Saudis
Mean
Scores
SD

Egyptians
Mean
Scores
SD

t

P

3.05

0.373

3.66

0.591

1.95

0.123

2.84
2.84
2.89

0.383
0.386
0.359

3.66
3.69
3.67

0.610
0.629
0.610

2.54
2.57
2.48

0.064
0.062
0.068

Table 5. 33: Perceptions by viewers of Egyptian entertainment channels
According to that, a minority of Saudis who have negative perceptions of
Saudi women rarely watch Egyptian news channels and sometimes following
Egyptians entertainment channels. However, most Egyptians with the negative
perception are those who sometimes watch Egyptian news channels and
entertainment.
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Chapter 6: Discussion:
I. Conclusion:
The aim of this research is trying to differentiate between the way Saudi
women see themselves as well as the Saudi males' perception of them; and the way
Egyptians perceive them. Such perceptions are ignited by local and global media arms
that have critical roles in shaping and forming opinions or pre-set ideas about Saudi
women. Therefore, the study targeted two groups: Saudis and Egyptians of both
genders. The questionnaire aimed at revealing the perception each participant had of
Saudi women.

a) Television Viewership and Exposure:
Both Saudis and Egyptians consider TV to be an important source of
information and entertainment, which is consistent with Gerbner's assumption that
television remains and important source of messages, information and images around
the globe. Other media do not weaken the importance of television as it remains a
crucial source of information and entertainment (Gerbner et al., 1980 & 1986).
Although most Saudis and Egyptians sometimes resort to foreign news
channels; they both seek their local news. Saudis resort to their news channels for
information while never caring to follow the Egyptian channels; and vice versa
Egyptians turn to their local news channels while never follow the Saudi news
channels.
Most Saudis also follow Saudi entertainment while Egyptians never do.
However in the case of entertainment, Saudis follow the Egyptian entertainment. Both
follow the foreign entertainment.
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The famous gang rape incident in Saudi (Qatif girl) was reported differently
by each country's media. While the Saudi coverage showed the religious aspect of the
incident, the international coverage was sympathizing with the girl. For example,
editor Rasheed Abou Alsamh (Arab news, 2007) focused on the sin of adultery she
committed and Saudi people's approval of the punishment for the girl who went to
meet a stranger alone. The foreign sources, on the other hand, considered the girl a
victim and talked about how the girl was raped by a group of men over and over. For
example, Canadian National Post, The Globe, CNN, BBC and many other
international sources focused on the countries’ officials and citizens' disappointment
from the Saudi punishment. They called for the drop of the cruel sentence. Since the
foreign media was more visible and stronger than the Saudi media, the Saudi
administration feared the international outcry and changed its status to calm the
international pressure. (The Globe, 2007, The Guardian, 2007, Eltahawy, 2007 and
Black, 2008)
Questionnaire results show that 72% of Saudis heard of this incident while
only 21% of Egyptians heard of it. As expected, Saudis turned to their own local
channels while Egyptians turned to foreign channels. Not a single Egyptian turned to
a Saudi channel for information about this incident. Knowing what each country's
media presented; it is clear how each group understood and comprehend this incident.
Their position on this incident could be indicated by the information they got from
each media.
It is interesting to see that almost 58% of Egyptians were seeking foreign
channels only, 20% turned to Egyptian channels only, while none turned to Saudi
channels. Only 20% of them turned to both foreign and Egyptian. On the other hand,
only 2% of Saudis turned to all channels (foreign, Egyptian and Saudi) while 0% of
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Egyptians did. Saudis were mostly seeking Saudi channels (60%) followed by the
18% who followed Saudi and Foreign, then 17% followed foreign only, and finally
3% Egyptian channels only.
Based on the above results, small percentages of Saudis and Egyptians did
seek alternative sources in this incident. Both samples remain loyal to their initial
sources.
Other Likert scale statements showed more characteristics of the Saudi and
Egyptian audience. Most Saudis were in more agreement with trusting their favorite
channels' coverage of events and only obtaining information from their favorite TV
channel. However, most Egyptians were in less agreement with trusting their favorite
channels' coverage of events and disagreeing with only obtaining information from
their favorite TV channel. This confirms that Saudi TV viewers are not an active
audience and do not seek alternative sources while Egyptians can be considered an
active audience (apart from the rape incident).
While Rubin et al. considered the TV audience an active one, this contradicts
with the case of Saudi audience. They give attention to their channels, trust them and
only obtain information from them. Very few Saudis considered following different
sources. (Rubin, Perse & Taylor, 1988)

b) Saudi vs. Foreign media:
The movie industry is still new in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Although a
number of short and long Saudi movies have been released (whether promoting Saudi
and its women, portraying frustrations or just pure comedy), 44% of Egyptians heard
of any Saudi movie while more than 84% Saudis did. Egyptians have low knowledge
of Saudi movies while Saudis have a much higher knowledge about them. Out of
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these 44% of Egyptians who have heard about any Saudi movie, only 31% were eager
to watch the movie. Asking participants about the name of the movie they heard of
yielded interesting results. Majority of Egyptians (75%) recalled the first long Saudi
movie ever "Keif El Hal", which was shown in the “Cannes Film Festival” and
watched by many non Saudis, while only 6% heard of the second long movie ever
made "Menahi". Almost 13% of them wrote "Mais Hemdan's movie" or "the one that
has Mais in it" or "the one starred by Mais". Mais Hemdan is not a Saudi woman;
however, she played the role of one in the movie "Keif Al Hal". It is interesting to see
that out of the whole Saudi/Syrian cast, the one that people recalled was Mais who is
not Saudi and already famous among Egyptians. Furthermore, 2% mentioned "Tash
ma Tash", which is not a Saudi movie. It is a famous Saudi sitcom that is very popular
among Saudis. The 2% have just heard the name and wrote it down for a movie. On
the other hand, Saudis' answers were of much more variety. They mentioned the two
long movies as well as some short movies.
The Saudi movies were screened on Egyptian cinemas and air on Rotana
Cinema regularly. However, the majority of Egyptians choose to flip the channel and
not watch the movies. This has nothing to do with accessibility because Egyptians
visit the movie theatres for Egyptian and western movies and they also watch their
favorite movies and programs on Rotana Cinema. The reason maybe either not
comprehending the accent or not accepting the culture or trusting the quality of the
movie or even not being interested in watching it. The conclusion is that Egyptians
have low knowledge of Saudi movies and it is not a result of accessibility nor
availability. This is further confirmed by Morgan, Shanahan and Harris (1990) who
confirmed that even with the appearance of new technology that solves the problem of
accessibility; the watching habits of the audience will not be affected. They will still
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look for their favorites and might resist diversifying. Dobrow (1990) further
confirmed this by claiming that heavy viewers will use the new technology available
to view more of the programs and movies they are used to watch.
The perception each participant had of the different media gave interesting
results. Though both Egyptians and Saudis agreed that foreign media are the most
credible, have highest quality and most variety, they disagreed on which media they
trusted more. Saudis picked their own media as the most trusted while Egyptians
trusted foreign media the most.
Each country's media had a different way in covering issues related to Saudi
women. Saudis believe that western media portray a negative incorrect image of
Saudi women while Saudi media portray the accurate positive image of them. Saudis
were neutral on the way Egyptian media portrayed their women but many of them
believed that they portray a negative inaccurate image of them. Egyptians on the other
hand, agreed that western media portray a negative inaccurate image of Saudi women
but their percentages of agreement were which much lower than those of Saudis.
Egyptians were neutral on how Saudi media portrayed them, but they were less
convinced that the Saudi media portray accurate or positive image. They were also
neutral on the portrayal of Egyptian media, but they were less convinced that they
portray an accurate or negative image.
When participants were asked to name a Saudi, Egyptian and foreign woman
pioneer in any field, most Egyptian participants skipped and did not know any Saudi
woman while Saudis wrote a long list of women pioneer in different fields. Names
that Egyptians came up with were mostly media persons (book authors, directors,
singers and TV presenters). They are more familiar with these than other scientists or
political figures. On the other hand, most participants of both nationalities did not find
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it difficult to recall a foreign pioneer woman. Also, participants from both
nationalities easily recalled Egyptian pioneer women from different fields.
To conclude, Saudi media have a stronger impact on Saudis than Egyptians
while foreign media have a greater influence on Egyptians. Saudis turn to their
channels to access information while Egyptians never turn to them and resort to
foreign media. Moreover, the foreign media are thought to be the most trusted,
credible and of highest quality by Egyptians, while Saudis still trust their own
channels though not finding them the most diversified in programs nor of highest
quality.
A cultivation effect was illustrated in understanding the issue of Saudi women
for TV audience. They see through the eyes of TV even if there are many
inconsistencies between the truth and what is portrayed on the screen (Byrant and
Zillman, 1994). In the light of this, Egyptians' negative perception of Saudi women is
understandable since they choose foreign media for reference; while Saudis stick to
their local channels and are religiously inoculated since childhood. The huge
difference between both groups in describing the status of Saudi women can be
related not only to their TV exposure over time but also to the source they choose.

c) Perception:
Regarding the perception, the questionnaire revealed interesting results. In
most parts, Saudis and Egyptians had very different and contradicting perceptions of
Saudi women. For example, most Saudi participants confirmed that the rules set for
women in Saudi are derived from Islamic Sharia and Quran. On the other hand,
Egyptians had a different opinion; they saw that these rules are enforced and derived
from the Saudi traditions and customs. However, both samples agreed that Islamic

113

clerics rank the second most powerful while the interior ministry is the least powerful.
According to Mtango (2004), article 1 of the Saudi law confirms that the constitution
and everything that has to do with the country as a whole must be derived from Quran
and Hadith only. Saudis study this in schools and the government never forgets to
remind its nation of this fact. However, such a concept may not be strongly
announced to the outside world.
A series of true or false statements revealed interesting results as well. As
mentioned before not all of these statements are true: some are correct, some are
incorrect while a couple of other statements were not true nor false but intended to
give an indication about the perception each person had.
The below correct statements showed significant difference between Saudis
who knew they were true and Egyptians who did not:


Saudi women can own a car in their name in the kingdom.



Saudi women can travel abroad without a male companion.



Saudi has gender mixed universities. (King Abdullah University of
Science and Technology is the first sex desegregated university in
Saudi). (Laessing & Alsharif, 2009)



Saudi women can work as journalists. (For example, Al Hayat's Amjad
Rida or Al Madina's Suhailah Zain El Abidin)



Saudi women can work as senior executives. (For example, Ghada
Ba'aqeel, Lama Al Sulaiman)



Saudi women can share offices with men. (Such as in Unilever and
Rotana). (Butters, 2009)
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Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi chamber of commerce.
(Lama Al Sulaiman and Nashwa Taher are the first two women to be
elected and join the chamber)

The below statements are correct too and showed differences between Saudis
who knew they were true and Egyptians who did not; but the difference was not as
huge:


Saudi women can have a passport or an identification card. (By the
year 1999, Prince Ahmed gave Saudi women the right to hold their
own IDs and passports separate from their fathers and husbands).
(Women's International Network News, 2000)



Saudi women can work as doctors. (For example, Hayat Sindi)



Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to drive. (In 1990,
around 50 women sent their drivers away and drove their own cars in
the streets of Riyadh calling for their right to drive). (Doumato, 1991)

The below are incorrect statements that showed huge difference between Saudi
who knew they were false and Egyptians who did not:


Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe



Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to vote.



Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to work.

in public.

The below are also incorrect statements that showed difference between
Saudis who knew they were untrue and Egyptians who did not, but the difference was
not as huge:
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Saudi women can drive in the kingdom.



Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi parliament.



Saudi women are allowed to work as judges.

The below statements are neither true nor false; but stating that they are true
gives an indication of a positive perception of Saudi women:


Saudi women are happy with their status in the society.



Saudi women can choose their future husbands.



Saudi women are eager to seek higher education as their peer men.

Results showed that the difference between Saudis and Egyptians who
approved these statements is huge except for the last statement. Most Saudis indicated
that the above statements were true while most Egyptians thought otherwise.

The below statements are neither true nor false; but stating that they are true
gives an indication of a negative perception of Saudi women:


Saudi's schools' curricula are completely based on Islam.



Saudi women live as second class citizens.



Saudi women live a struggled life.

Results also showed that the difference between Saudis and Egyptians who
approved these statements is significant except for the first statement. Most Saudis
indicated that the above statements were true while most Egyptians thought otherwise.
It is important to note that many Saudis were offended and expressed their anger from
the above statements; in fact some of them refused to continue the questionnaire.
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A number of statements on the Likert scale also showed intriguing results.
Majority of Saudis perceive their country as the closet country to Islam, agree that
Islam called for face veil as well as sex segregation, believe that true Islam is
implemented in their country, trust that Saudi women are satisfied with their
conditions, consider the Saudi women to be ideal Islamic women and disagree that
Saudi men prefer women to be second class citizens. However, Egyptians disagreed
with all the statements and believed that Saudi men prefer to keep their women as
second class citizens. But both samples agreed that non Saudis have a wrong
perception of Saudi women. Saudis expressed more agreement with this statement
than Egyptians did. Overall, the difference between both samples' results was huge;
they both took extreme sides of the coin.
To conclude the above results, it is clear that Egyptians have a negative
perception of Saudi women while Saudis have a positive perception of them. When
relating the perception each group had with the hours spent watching TV, results grab
anyone's attention. Saudis with the most negative perception are those who watched
TV the least (between 1 to less than 4 hours per week). Egyptians, on the other hand,
had different results. Those who had negative perceptions of Saudi women were
heavy TV watchers (who watched for 7 hours or more per week). This goes in
harmony with Gerbner et al. (1980) assumptions. They defined the heavy TV user as
anyone who watches TV for 4 hours or more per day. They believe that for these
heavy users, TV will monopolize over any other media; the influence of the heavy TV
exposure is what they called cultivation.
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d) TV Exposure and Perceptions of Saudi Women:
Egyptians with the most negative perception of Saudi women were those who
never or rarely watched Saudi media (news or entertainment). They sometimes
followed their own Egyptian news and entertainment channels. However, they were
heavy users of foreign media. Those Egyptians who indicated negative perceptions
were those who were addictive to foreign media. They sometimes watched foreign
news and frequently turned to foreign entertainment. As Gerbner and Gross (1976)
claimed, heavy users will see through the TV eyes; the televised side of matters. Since
Egyptians are heavy viewers of foreign media, their perception of Saudi women are
close to the foreign media coverage and sources rather than any other source.
Saudis, on the other hand, mostly had a positive perception of their women. A
minority of them believed otherwise. This minority never or rarely turned to Saudi
news or entertainment channels; however they sometimes watched the foreign media.
Though they rarely followed Egyptian news channels, they sometimes watched
Egyptian entertainment.
According to this sample, the majority of Saudis were following the Saudi
channels more than any other available channel. However, they also turned to foreign
channels in many cases; but the impact of foreign channels on Saudis remains weak to
an extent. Most Saudis have a positive perception about their country and women.
This is confirmed by Abou Alsamh (2002) who said that Saudis themselves are as
concerned about preserving their culture as their governments and officials. They are
convinced that they are the luckiest and most privileged to belong to the Kingdom as
Elanor Doumato (1990) also mentioned.
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II. Limitations of the research:
The use of non random sampling technique in the research does not allow the
results to be generalized to both populations. However, the lack of population
information in both countries forces the researcher to utilize the non random
techniques. Moreover, Egyptian participants were Cairo residents only and Saudi
participants were Riyadh and Jeddah residents; therefore, results cannot be
generalized to the whole populations.
The researcher focuses on the general perceptions of both populations and
does not expand to include more details and other factors affecting the perceptions
created.
Most literature found about the Saudi women was done by foreigners who are
not very welcomed by the Saudi community; therefore, they see an artificial outside
look of the Saudi community.
Saudi by nature is a closed gated community which made the distribution of
the survey more difficult. One cannot walk in the streets of the Kingdom and ask
people to fill questionnaires. Reaching enough Saudi participants for the sake of the
research was difficult. Moreover, many Saudis refused to fill the questionnaire for
different reasons: some were afraid to speak their mind while others did not
understand what a questionnaire is. Other participants refused for other reasons that
they refused to mention. Several Saudis were offended by the study and some of the
questions in the questionnaire. For example, rather than just indicating that "Saudi
women live as second class citizens" is false, they expressed their anger and refused
to complete the questionnaire.
The distribution of questionnaires and analysis were done before the
Egyptian and Tunisian revolution took place. The revolutions spread in the Middle
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East might urge some Saudis to revolt against the regime and call for freedom, such as
Najla Elhariri who drove her car in the streets of Jeddah influenced by the revolutions
taking place in different Middle East countries. However, it is important to note that
this research was conducted before the revolutions.

III. Recommendations for Future Studies:
This study has focused on the preexisting perceptions about Saudi women;
therefore, researchers should focus on the factors behind such perception. Is television
the sole factor? Is it the strongest factor in creating stereotypes? What are the other
influences?
Saudis own different channels which air their newly directed movies,
programs and series. Researchers should direct their attention to study the
effectiveness, availability and reach of these channels on the Saudi population as well
as the foreign audience. Reasons for watching or not watching them should also be
investigated.
More female Saudi researchers should study the Saudi community because
they are the most welcomed to enter and investigate the community. Being a female
and a Saudi powers their status and gives them access to many angles. Portraying
Saudi from an inside eye is important.
Moreover, using media as tools to eliminate or change stereotypes about
Saudi women should be focused upon and studied by media scholars.
Finally, the revolutions occurring in many Arab countries should be focused
upon. Would it reach Saudi? Would Saudis revolt and ask for a freer country? Or
would they still resist? Future research should look for reasons leading to or hindering
a Saudi revolution.
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Appendix A: Questionnaire Sample (English Version)
Dear Participant,
This survey is conducted for a journalism and mass communication graduate thesis at the American University in
Cairo. The aim of the study is to investigate perceptions of Saudi women. Anonymity of the participants is
promised. Please answer the following:

1. What is your nationality?
A. Egyptian
B. Saudi (please move to Question 4)
C. Other (please terminate, thank you for your time)
2. Have you ever visited Saudi Arabia for any reason other than Hajj or Omra?
A. Yes
B. No (please move to Question 4)
3. How long was your visit to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia?
A. 10 days or less
B. More than 10 (Please terminate, thank you for your time)
4. Do you watch TV for at least one hour per week?
A. Yes.
B. No (Please terminate, thank you for your time).
5. On average, how many hours do you spend watching TV per week?
A. 1- under 4 hours
B. 4 hours – under 7 hours
C. 7 hours or more
6. How often do you watch Saudi news channels (Saudi channels or channels owned by Saudis)?
A. Never
B. Rarely
C. Sometimes
D. Frequently
E. Always
7. How often do you watch Egyptian news channels (Egyptian channels or channels owned by
Egyptians)?
A. Never
B. Rarely
C. Sometimes
D. Frequently
E. Always
8. How often do you watch foreign news channels? (Foreign channels or channels owned by
foreigners)
A. Never
B. Rarely
C. Sometimes
D. Frequently
E. Always
9. How often do you watch Saudi entertainment channels? (programs, films, series hosted, presented
or acted by Saudis)
A. Never
B. Rarely
C. Sometimes
D. Frequently
E. Always
10. How often do you watch Egyptian entertainment channels? (programs, films, series hosted,
presented or acted by Egyptians)
A. Never
B. Rarely
C. Sometimes
D. Frequently
E. Always
11. How often do you watch foreign entertainment channels? (programs, films, series hosted,
presented or acted by foreigners)
A. Never
B. Rarely
C. Sometimes
D. Frequently
E. Always
12. Which TV channels do you trust the most? (Please pick one only)
A. Saudi
B. Egyptian
C. Foreign
13. Which TV channels are the most credible? (Please pick one only)
A. Saudi
B. Egyptian
C. Foreign
14. Which TV channels are the most accessible to you? (Please pick one only)
A. Saudi
B. Egyptian
C. Foreign
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15. Which TV channels have the highest quality? (Please pick one only)
A. Saudi
B. Egyptian
C. Foreign
16. Which TV channels have the most variety of programs? (Please pick one only)
A. Saudi
B. Egyptian
C. Foreign
17. Please rank the following according to their power in setting the rules in Saudi for women? (Give
scores to each: 1 being least powerful and 5 being the most powerful)
A. The King. ( )
B. Islam and Quran. ( )
C. Islamic clerics and sheikhs. ( )
D. Saudi traditions and customs. ( )
E. Interior ministry. ( )
F. others, please specify: _______________
In your opinion, please indicate if the following statements are either true (√ ) or false (x):
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Saudi women are happy with their status in the society
Saudi women can drive in the kingdom
Saudi women can own a car in their name in the kingdom
Saudi women can have a passport or an identification card
Saudi women can choose their future husbands
Saudi women can travel abroad without a male companion
Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public
Saudi's schools' curricula are completely based on Islam
Saudi has gender mixed universities
More than half of Saudi's school graduates are female
Saudi women can work as journalists
Saudi women can work as senior executives
Saudi women can work as doctors
Saudi women can share offices with men
Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi chamber of commerce
Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi parliament
Saudi women are allowed to work as judges
Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to drive
Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to vote
Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to work
Saudi women live as second class citizens
Saudi women live a struggled life
Saudi women are eager to seek higher education as their peer men

(
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(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Please mark with (√ ) your agreement with the following statements:
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
agree

41. Saudi Arabia is the closet
country to a pure Islamic
society.
42. Islam calls for sex
segregation.
43. Islam calls for face veil
(niqab).
44. True Islam is
implemented in Saudi Arabia.
45. Saudi women are satisfied
with their lives.
46. Saudi women are the ideal
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Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
agree

Islamic women.
47. I trust my favorite TV
channel's coverage of issues
48. Saudi's government is
responsible for Saudi
women's current condition
and status.
49. Western media portray a
negative image of Saudi
women.
50. Western media portray an
accurate image of Saudi
women.
51. Saudi media portray a
positive image of Saudi
women.
52. Saudi media portray an
accurate image of Saudi
women.
53. Egyptian media portray a
negative image of Saudi
women.
54. Egyptian media portray an
accurate image of Saudi
women.
55. My idea of Saudi women
is based on what I saw and
heard on TV or any other
media.
56. TV is a source of
entertainment for me.
57. TV is a source of
information for me.
58. I only obtain information
from my favorite TV channel
59. Saudi men prefer their
women to be second class
citizens.
60. I usually flip between my
favorite news channel and
other channels.
61. Non Saudis have a wrong
perception of Saudi women.
62. TV has an effect on my
perception of issues.
63. Have you travelled outside your country?
A. Yes
B. No
64. Have you heard about any Saudi movie?
A. Yes
B. No (Please move to Question 67)
65. Please tell us its name:_______________
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66. Have you watched it?
A. Yes.
B. No.
67. Have you heard about the Saudi girl who was raped in Qatif?
A. Yes
B. No (Please move to Question 69)
68. If yes, then from which channel? (pick all that apply)
A. Saudi channels
B. Egyptian channels

C. Foreign channels

69. Name a Saudi woman pioneer in any field: ___________________________
70. Name an Egyptian woman pioneer in any field: _______________________
71. Name a foreign woman pioneer in any field: __________________________
72. Your Age:
A. Less than 21.
B. 21 – less than 30.
D. 30 – less than 40.
E. 40 – less than 50.
F. 50 and above.
73. Gender:
A. Female
B. Male
74. Level of education:
A. No formal education
B. Primary-High School
C. Community college/ Diploma
D. Undergraduate Student
E. Bachelor Degree Holder
F. Graduate Student
G. Graduate degree holder, please specify: ____________________________
75. If you are Egyptian, Please specify your income level per month below: (Saudis go to next
question)
A. Less than 1000.
B. 1,000 – less than 5,000.
C. 5,000 – less than 10,000.
D. 10,000 – less than 15,000.
E. 15,000 and above.
76. If you are Saudi, Please specify your income level per month below:
A. Less than 1000.
B. 1,000 – less than 5,000.
C. 5,000 – less than 10,000.
D. 10,000 – less than 15,000.
E. 15,000 and above.

Thank you for your time and participation.
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Appendix B: Questionnaire Sample (Arabic Version)
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